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Trial is the paradigmatic process for administering criminal justice in
the United States. Its hallmark is the set of constitutional and statutory
rights that serve as obstacles to conviction.' Even though these rights
weight the trial process in the defendant's favor, few defendants choose to
stand trial. Most convictions result from guilty pleas.2
The guilty-plea process, unlike the trial process, is not weighted to dis-
favor conviction. No elaborate set of constitutional and statutory protec-
tions surrounds the defendant's threshold decision whether or not to stand
trial.' Rather, the primary obstacle to conviction by plea is the defendant's
* The Yale Law Journal encourages noneditor students at the law school to submit written work
that meets Journal standards. Each year the Journal seeks to print one or more such pieces. This
Comment is published in accordance with that policy.
t J.D., Yale Law School, 1981.
I am grateful to Professor Barbara Underwood for her guidance and encouragement during the
preparation of this Comment.
1. Among the constitutional rights available to federal and state defendants who stand trial are the
right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the right to confront one's accusers,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the right to avoid self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964), and the right to be convicted only under a high standard of proof, In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard constitutionally required).
Other rights respond less to the need to protect innocent defendants than to other requirements of a
fair criminal process. These include the right to be charged by a grand jury selected without racial
discrimination, Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), and the right not to be convicted on the
basis of unconstitutionally seized evidence, Mapp v. Ohio, 3.67 U.S. 643 (1961).
The statutory right of primary significance for this Comment is the right to pretrial discovery. Most
jurisdictions have statutes authorizing pretrial discovery, many of which are patterned after FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1154-59
(5th ed. 1980). In the federal courts, the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976 & Supp. 1979), re-
quires prosecutors to disclose the prior statements of a trial witness once that witness has completed
testifying.
2. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 1-2 (App. Draft 1968) (estimates that 95% of convictions in some localities are
by plea) [hereinafter cited as ABA PLEA STANDARDS]; H. MILLER, W. MCDONALD, & J. CRAMER,
PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1978) (estimates that 70% to 90% of convictions in
most jurisdictions are by plea).
3. Defendants who plead guilty to charges "may not thereafter raise independent claims relating
to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Exceptions have been made for due process claims, Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and for double jeopardy claims, Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61
(1975) (per curiam). Saltzburg and Westen have debated what principles distinguish constitutional
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own perception of his chance of acquittal. Indeed, the preponderance of
guilty-plea convictions is due chiefly to prosecutors implicitly and explic-
itly offering defendants advantages that appear to outweigh that chance.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the defendant's assessment of
the likelihood of acquittal plays a critical role in guarding against inaccu-
rate and unfair convictions.' Yet no court has enunciated standards for
prosecutorial behavior to ensure that the defendant's opportunity to make
that assessment is meaningful. Thus, although prior to a plea the defen-
dant is entitled to be informed of the elements of the charges against him5
and to understand that by pleading guilty he waives some constitutional
rights,6 he is not entitled to prosecutorial disclosure of the evidence avail-
able to convict him.7 The defendant is thereby deprived of the information
he most needs for a rational evaluation of his chances of acquittal. More-
over, the evidence available for conviction, unlike legal information about
the charges or about constitutional rights, is exclusively in the prosecutor's
possession, is costly to discover by independent investigation, and cannot
claims that survive guilty pleas from those which do not. See Westen, Away from Waiver: A Ratio-
nale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Westen, Away from Waiver]; Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of
Constitutional Rights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978); Wes-
ten, Forfeiture By Guilty Plea - A Reply, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1308 (1978). For another discussion,
see Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1980).
4. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970).
5. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976).
6. A defendant is entitled to know that his plea of guilty waives his right to a jury trial, his
privilege against self-incrimination, and his right of confrontation. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 (1969). This information is important because it protects factually innocent defendants from
pleading guilty on the mistaken belief that trial will not offer them the procedural safeguards they
will need in order to establish their innocence. See Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Reme-
dies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 503 (1978). Despite the importance of this
information, the Supreme Court has, subsequent to Boykin, upheld guilty pleas by defendants who
had not been advised on the record of the specified rights. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
28-29 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970). In light of these later cases, some
lower federal and state courts have read Boykin not to require specific articulation of waived rights.
See, e.g., Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974); State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 425,
183 N.W.2d 763, 765 (1971); Edwards v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 231, 234, 186 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1971).
Even if Boykin is read to require articulation on the record of the rights waived, however, the case
made spedfic reference only to the defendant's right to trial by jury, privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and right to confront witnesses. Pleading guilty also deprives defendants of a large number of
other rights. See Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional
Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1970) (listing constitutional rights waived,
including right to challenge unlawful search or coerced confession and right to attack insufficient
indictment or composition of grand jury).
7. Mandatory preplea disclosure has rarely, and then only narrowly, been recognized. See Com-
ment, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the Likelihood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
527, 528 n.7 (1971); note 157 infra (noting recent cases recognizing duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence). Several commentators have criticized this absence of a preplea disclosure duty. See, e.g.,
Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 316-19 (1960); Com-
ment, supra, at 529-35.
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readily be supplied by defense counsel.8 In short, disclosure of evidence is
critical to the fairness of the guilty-plea process.
This Comment presents the case for preplea disclosure. It first describes
the ways in which the imbalance of information in plea bargaining threat-
ens the fairness of that process, and argues that some disclosure is needed
to prevent the identified abuses. To define the proper role for disclosure in
the guilty-plea process, the Comment then examines both the actual oper-
ation of the bargaining process and three competing conceptions of the
legitimating function of plea bargaining-to replicate trial results, to
achieve factual accuracy, and to generate transactions to which both par-
ties have given meaningful consent. After rejecting the first two concep-
tions as inaccurate characterizations of the guilty-plea process, and con-
cluding that the consensual-transaction conception provides both an
accurate characterization of plea bargaining and a foundation for disclo-
sure reforms, the Comment argues that disclosure must be broad in scope
to ensure the defendant a meaningful opportunity to assess his chances of
acquittal, and thereby to make meaningful the consent on which the legiti-
macy of plea bargaining rests. Finally, the Comment considers the effects
of broad pre~lea disclosure both on guilty-plea practices and on trials. It
concludes that the proposed reform would not have substantial or un-
acceptable effects on the number or expeditiousness of guilty pleas, but
would lead to the acceptable-even desirable-consequence of more dis-
closure before trial than current law requires.
I. The Consequences of the Informational Imbalance
In the American criminal justice system, the prosecutor has much
greater access to the information available for conviction' than does the
defendant."0 That imbalance in information poses a threat to the fairness
8. In contrast, the defendant's counsel can supply much other information, including information
about the elements of the crimes charged, the rights waived by pleading guilty, judicial attitudes in the
jurisdiction, and sentencing and parole practices.
9. Because the government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is only the prosecutor's case that always affects the trial outcome. Only if that case appears
strong enough to put the defendant in danger of conviction does the defendant's information become
relevant to the trial outcome. At the first stage, then, trial outcome depends only on the prosecutor's
information that will be available for conviction at trial.
10. The severity of the imbalance of information varies considerably with the resources made
available to defense counsel. Wealthy defendants can often narrow-or even close-the informational
gap. Moreover, some indigent defendants are more adequately informed than most defendants who
can afford private counsel: some urban public-defender offices, unlike most private defense attorneys,
employ investigators as permanent staff members, see Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1229 n.139 (1975), and most defendants who can pay for private
counsel cannot afford the added expense of an investigator, see Steinberg, The Responsibility of the
Defense Lawyer in Criminal Cases, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 442, 443 (1961) (defendant seldom has
resources to hire investigators or experts, or to pay for attorney's airfare to visit distant witnesses or
other sources of evidence); Steinberg & Paulsen, A Conversation with Defense Counsel on Problems
1583
The Yale Law Journal
and accuracy of the criminal process." Although current law addresses the
threatened inequities in the trial process, 12 it affords little relief to defen-
dants who face the serious problems caused by the informational imbal-
ance in the guilty-plea process.1 3 Among these problems are bluffing by
prosecutors and inadequate representation by defense attorneys, both of
which adversely affect the defendant's ability to evaluate his chances for
acquittal and arguably rise to the level of misconduct. Neither abuse can
be prevented by the adoption and enforcement of any objective standards
to ensure that the prosecutor and the defense counsel accurately assess the
probability of conviction. By contrast, direct measures to correct the infor-
mational imbalance in the guilty-plea process hold out the possibility of
eliminating most of the abuses.
A. Bluffing by the Prosecution
Confronted with a defendant who is uninformed about the evidence
available or likely to be available for trial, a prosecutor may bluff or mis-
lead the defendant about the strength of the government's case. The prose-
cutor may thereby obtain a plea from, or a stiffer sentence for, the defen-
dant than would otherwise be possible.
Bluffing about the information available for trial is advantageous to the
prosecutor if the government's case has either of two weaknesses. 4 First,
the prosecutor may have so little evidence that, even if all of it were
of a Criminal Defense, PRAC. LAW., May 1961, at 25, 28 (without money, defense is deprived of
laboratory tests, photographs, copies of documents, necessary medical examinations, and depositions).
Even reasonably wealthy defendants, when confronting such sophisticated prosecutorial machines as
the federal government, are at a significant disadvantage. See Steinberg, supra, at 443 (on govern-
ment's side are prosecutor and assistants, police officers, detectives, FBI agents, tax sleuths, ballistics
experts, wiretappers, doctors, scientists, and handwriting experts).
Financial resources aside, the defendant generally has poorer access to witnesse, and relevant
records. Not only does the prosecutor have procedural tools to encourage or even to compel witnesses
to come forth, see Steinberg, supra, at 443 (prosecutor can send summons to fetch witness, send
detective to question or bring in witness, and obtain sworn testimony at grand jury proceeding), but
most people are more willing to cooperate with the government than with a defendant, see Louisell,
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent? 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 87 (1961) (neutral witnesses
more likely to overcome natural reluctance to get involved in legal proceedings for prosecution than
defense); Steinberg & Paulsen, supra, at 27 (whereas witnesses consider it respectable to cooperate
with prosecutors, they do not like to get involved with preparation for criminal defense).
11. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 66 (1968); Comment, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose
Reconsidered, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480, 483-84; Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Re-
veal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-45 (1964).
12. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (right to fair trial includes right to disclosure of
exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment). To supplement the constitutional requirement,
most jurisdictions have either common-law or statutory provisions for pretrial discovery. See note 1
supra.
13. See note 7 supra.
14. In addition, bluffing may benefit the prosecutor by saving resources when the case is not
sufficiently important-for political or other reasons-to go to trial. Insufficient importance of this
sort is not an informational weakness.
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presented at trial, the defendant would not be found guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Especially if the evidence suffices to establish probable
cause, the prosecutor may be tempted to misrepresent the factual suffi-
ciency of her case."5 Second, the prosecutor may have evidence that is suf-
ficient to persuade a factfinder of the defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, but that cannot all be presented at trial. Faced with practical
weaknesses such as the unavailability of a witness for trial or the loss or
destruction of evidence, or with constitutional weaknesses such as the un-
lawfulness of a search or the involuntariness of a confession, the prosecu-
tor, convinced that the defendant is in fact guilty, may misrepresent the
legal sufficiency of her case. Bluffing in these circumstances is frequent
because prosecutors commonly believe that obtaining pleas from factually
guilty but legally innocent defendants16 is a major legitimate advantage of
plea bargaining."
Bluffing by prosecutors may take many forms. The most blatant form is
the bringing of charges against a defendant on evidence that will not, be-
cause of factual or legal weaknesses, be sufficient to convict at trial."s A
15. Prosecutors condemn the filing of- wholly unsupported charges, see McDonald, Cramer, &
Rossman, Prosecutorial Bluffing and the Case against Plea-Bargaining, in PLEA-BARGAINING 1, 4 (W.
McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980), but prosecutors regularly file charges in cases in which the
evidence is not likely to satisfy the burden of proof, see id. at 4-5. Cf Alschuler, supra note 11, at 63
(prosecutors often offer unusual concessions in one-witness identification cases).
16. A defendant is factually guilty if he actually committed the offenses charged. By contrast, a
defendant is legally guilty if he is convicted after a factual determination
made in procedurally regular fashion and by authorities acting within competences duly allo-
cated to them. Furthermore, he is not to be held guilty, even though the factual determination
is or might be adverse to him, if various rules designed to protect him and to safeguard the
integrity of the process are not given effect ....
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 166 (1968). The rules relevant to legal guilt
include the principles of evidence, jurisdiction, venue, statute of limitations, double jeopardy, and
criminal responsibility. See id. The concept of legal guilt also incorporates the practical constraints on
actually obtaining a conviction in a particular case, thus taking into account the idiosyncratic circum-
stances of the case. See McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman, supra note 15, at 6; Rhodes, Plea-Bargain-
ing, Crime Control, and Due Process: A Quantitative Analysis, in PLEA-BARGAINING 115, 122 (W.
McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980).
In light of the above definitions, factual guilt can never be fully known, and legal guilt cannot be
fully ascertained until a defendant stands trial. See id. at 122. In this Comment, however, legal and
factual guilt are treated as requiring only a high probability of legal and factual guilt in their extreme
senses. Moreover, although "legal guilt" might be used to characterize defendants convicted by plea,
this Comment uses the term only in reference to trial conviction. See id. at 123 (defendants who plead
guilty should be considered legally guilty if there is likelihood of conviction at hypothetical trial); c.
Church, In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 509, 516 (1979) (legal innocence is
merely attorney's prediction of trial outcome).
17. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 62-63 (personal belief in defendant's factual guilt underlies
decision to increase pressures to plead guilty when case is weak); McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman,
supra note 15, at 7-9 (prosecutors believe factually guilty defendants should not escape conviction
because of administrative or logistical errors, but deny that distinction between factual and legal guilt
underlies decision to bluff).
18. This prosecutorial practice constitutes overcharging to whatever extent the charges are filed
primarily to facilitate negotiation of a plea favorable to the prosecutor and not to anticipate accurately
the offenses the prosecutor will try to prove at trial. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 86-87.
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second obvious form of bluffing is the refusal to dismiss charges that were
supportable when filed, but due to subsequent intervening events, are no
longer supported by evidence sufficient to convict.' 9 Such practices, which
are themselves misrepresentations, are likely to be accompanied by the
prosecutor's attempting to induce a guilty plea by leading the defendant to
believe that the government has evidence sufficiently convincing to merit
trial.20
Misrepresentations of these sorts may be motivated other than by bad
faith or vindictiveness.21 Although prosecutors have little excuse for filing
inadequately supported charges, they are under strong institutional pres-
sures not to move for dismissal once charges have been filed. These pres-
sures are of two kinds. First, many prosecutors' offices expect their staffs
to maintain high conviction rates,22 and unlike not bringing charges, a
dismissal of charges affects those rates. Second, a dismissal of charges may
be reviewed both by superiors and by critics outside the office, who may
characterize the prosecutor's initial decision to file charges as an error of
judgment.23 That prospect makes a decision to move for dismissal of
charges more difficult than a decision not to bring them, because the latter
decision is subject to much more limited review.
Whatever the motivation, bluffing by prosecutors may take forms much
less blatant than outright lies in the service of unsupportable charges. One
of the more subtle kinds of bluffing is setting a trial date before the case is
ready;2' another is failing to inform the defendant of changes favorable to
Prosecutors may file charges more severe than the evidence is likely to support even without regard
to plea bargaining leverage. They may file such charges in good faith, seeking to prepare for the
remote possibility that the evidence will materialize. Id. at 92. In addition, because they often antici-
pate conviction by plea, prosecutors simply may not bother with the "difficult calculation" of what
charges are probably accurate. See L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 58 (1977).
19. See LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS 132-35 (D. McIntyre ed. 1967); McDonald,
Cramer, & Rossman, supra note 15, at 5.
20. Prosecutors engage in this practice regularly, if not frequently. See LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
THE METROPOLIS, supra note 19, at 132-35; McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman, supra note 15, at 5. In
particular, prosecutors do not hesitate to hide weaknesses caused by administrative error. Id.
21. See McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman, supra note 15, at 10 (table 1-1) (listing good-faith
reasons why prosecutors initially overrepresent their cases).
22. See R. NIMMER, THE NATURE OF SYSTEM CHANGE 40 (1978) (gross rate of convictions is
readily available measure of effectiveness); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion - A Comment, 60
NW. U.L. REV. 174, 180 (1965) (prosecutors view unsuccessful prosecutions as waste of time and
money); c. Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 93-94 (1976) (prosecu-
tors under administrative pressure to secure convictions efficiently). But c. Levin, Delay in Five
Criminal Courts, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 93 (1975) (prosecutors are concerned more with general
caseload than with maintaining conviction rate).
23. See Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and
Common Crimes, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 431, 455 (1979) (formal dispositions of white-collar crime
cases subject to extraordinary public scrutiny and internal deliberations). But cf Levin, supra note 22,
at 93 (little public attention given to overall prosecution of common felonies).
24. See McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman, supra note 15, at 19 (table 1-3). But cf. Kuh, Plea
Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48, 51
(1975) (guidelines prohibiting prosecutors from giving statement of readiness if state is not in fact
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him in the status of evidence already disclosed to him.2" Even merely of-
fering a defendant a sentence or charge reduction is a form of bluffing
when the implication it carries is false-namely, that the government's
case would actually support a stiffer sentence or a higher charge than that
incorporated in the offer. Because accepting a defense attorney's offer of a
plea bargain carries the same implication, the prosecutor's acceptance of
the offer should likewise be viewed as passive bluffing whenever the im-
plication is false. The last two descriptions of bluffing may not seem, on
the surface, to involve misrepresentation of the government's case; because
a plea bargain, however, is attractive to a defendant only insofar as it
reduces his actual exposure to punishment,26 a prosecutor's extending or
accepting an offer of a plea bargain makes sense only if she intends the
defendant to believe that trial is likely to result in a stiffer punishment
than that incorporated in the plea bargain. When that suggestion is false,
the prosecutor should be recognized as actively or passively seeking to
mislead the defendant about the strengths and weaknesses of the govern-
ment's case." This form of bluffing, like the others, forces the defendant to
bargain on the basis of false information.
B. Inadequate Defense Counsel
Prosecutorial bluffing is not the only abuse permitted by a guilty-plea
process that does not mandate disclosure. The imbalance in information
that tempts the prosecutor to bluff also provides a fertile environment for
questionable conduct on the part of defense attorneys. Public defenders,
like prosecutors, are faced with overwhelming caseloads, 218 and private at-
torneys for low-income defendants have strong financial incentives to dis-
pose of cases quickly. 29 Moreover, the system itself provides incentives for
ready, or nearly ready, for trial).
25. See McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman, supra note 15, at 18 (table 1-3); id. at 20. At least one
court has condoned this behavior. People v. Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76, 375 N.E.2d 41, 404 N.Y.S.2d 85,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978) (upholding guilty-plea conviction although prosecutor failed to dis-
close death of eyewitness after having already disclosed witness as part of state's case).
26. See p. 1594 infra.
27. Cf Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89
HARV. L. REV. 293, 309 (1975) (pressures to plead guilty used to secure convictions not otherwise
obtainable).
28. See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1210 (public defenders have "grinding, overwhelming"
caseloads); cf Y. KANISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 11-12 (extraordinarily heavy
caseloads affect every aspect of criminal justice system and lead to emphasis on routine
decisionmaking).
29. See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1182 (economic success achieved either by using reputation as
trial lawyer to attract wealthy clients, or by handling large volume of low-income defendants, which
necessitates seeking plea dispositions); Levin, supra note 22, at 92 (because fee charged low-income
defendants cannot be increased above low level, defense attorneys seek to minimize time devoted to
cases); cf. M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 186 (1979) (study of lower court in New
Haven, Connecticut) (some private defense attorneys charge flat rate regardless of services provided or
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defense attorneys to please prosecutors. An attorney's cooperation with a
prosecutor in a particular case may induce the prosecutor to confer bene-
fits on the attorney, such as increased disclosure in that case." In addition,
many defense attorneys have a continuing relationship with prosecutors
that is more reciprocal than adversarial; in such a relationship, conces-
sions on behalf of one client may be traded for advantages on behalf of
another.31
For these reasons, a defense attorney may seek, without full regard for
the defendant's interests, to persuade his client to plead guilty. 2 In partic-
ular, the defense attorney may misrepresent to his client the chances for
acquittal at trial. With the defendant relying heavily on his attorney's
opinion about the advisability of proposed plea bargains," defense coun-
sel's misrepresentations utterly undermine the defendant's ability to pro-
tect his own interests.
C. The Failure of Objective Standards to Protect the Defendant's
Interests
Both the prosecutor and the defense attorney rest their decisions about
what to tell the defendant on their assessments of the probability of con-
viction.14 At one end of the probability scale is the case that is so weak
that it very likely would not survive a motion for a directed verdict. In
such a case, the charges filed clearly do not warrant a conviction, and
their very existence may mislead or bluff the defendant into believing that
the government has a case against him. 5 At this end of the scale, any
time spent).
30. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 68-69 (defense attorney must keep good relationship with
prosecutor's office); Battle, In Search of the Adversary System - The Cooperative Practices of Private
Criminal Defense Attorneys, 50 TEX. L. REV. 60, 67-80 (1971) (prosecutors open their files to de-
fense attorneys they like, even though they recognize cost of doing so). Voluntary jailhouse defenders
have especially strong incentives to cooperate with prosecutors. See White, A Proposal for Reform of
the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 444 (1971).
31. See M. FEELEY, supra note 29, at 194-95 (bargaining between defense attorneys and prosecu-
tors exhibits norm of reciprocity and may incorporate mutual accommodation in the form of implicit
package deals); Alschuler, supra note 11, at 95 (prosecutors' overcharging may be part of sham for
benefit of defense attorneys); Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1211 (describing use of package deals).
32. See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1180 (guilty-plea system leads even conscientious defense
attorneys occasionally to act contrary to clients' interests).
33. See H. MILLER, W. MCDONALD, & J. CRAMER, supra note 2, at 154 (defense counsel's
advice is critical and may have controlling influence on defendant's plea decision).
34. The prosecutor's offers to the defendant depend on her estimate of the likelihood of conviction,
if also on improper motives, see pp. 1584-87 supra; pp. 1594-1595 infra, and the defense attorney's
advice to the defendant depends on his estimate of the likelihood of conviction, if perhaps too on
improper motives, see pp. 1587-88 supra; pp. 1594-95 infra.
35. Bluffing of this sort occurs whenever defendants plead guilty to charges that would otherwise
be dismissed. See Finkelstein, supra note 27, at 311 n.51. But cd McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman,
supra note 15, at 4-5 (taking cases into system without sufficient evidence to meet high threshold of




willingness on the part of defense counsel to plea bargain would constitute
inadequate representation. At the other end of the probability scale is the
case that is so strong that it is almost certainly sufficient to elicit a guilty
verdict on the charges filed. At this end of the scale, bluffing is not a
problem because no misrepresentation by the prosecutor could lead the
defendant to overestimate his chances of conviction. Similarly, inadequate
defense counsel is not a problem because, at this extreme, conviction is
virtually certain whatever counsel does.
Most cases lie between the two poles, where conviction is possible but
not certain. Perhaps there is a specific probability of conviction below
which any prosecutorial offer of a plea bargain would constitute bluffing
and any defense-counsel willingness to plea bargain would constitute in-
adequate representation. Even if such a threshold probability exists, how-
ever, the probability of conviction in any particular case cannot be deter-
mined with even minimal accuracy. 6 It is often impossible to disprove a
prosecutor's representations that the case is ready for trial, even if the
admissible evidence is of questionable strength. 7 Nor can a defense attor-
ney's assertion that the government has a strong case often be challenged
as a misrepresentation. Thus, there is little hope of developing objective
criteria by which to police the reliability of a prosecutor's or a defense
counsel's representations to the defendant of the strength of the govern-
ment's case. The only way the criminal process may be able to guard
against misleading representations to the defendant is to allow the defen-
dant to make his own evaluation of the likelihood of conviction.
In sum, prosecutors and defense attorneys commonly make low-visibil-
36. At least two studies have attempted to predict the probability of conviction at trial. J. EISEN-
STEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE 173-311 (1977); Rhodes, Plea Bargaining: Its Effect on Sentenc-
ing and Convictions in the District of Columbia, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1979). About
the difficulties of making such predictions, Rhodes wrote:
Once cases have been accepted for prosecution, it is difficult to predict whether they will lead
to a conviction at trial. Perhaps this can be attributed to the vagaries of judges and juries;
perhaps the quality of evidence, especially witness testimony, cannot be accurately assessed
until the time of the trial; or perhaps the variables, or their measurement, used in this analysis
fail to capture what is important in convincing a judge or a jury of guilt.
Id. at 369-70 (footnote omitted). Eisenstein and Jacob similarly concluded that predictions of the
chance of acquittal in a particular case are highly unreliable. J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra, at
241-43.
Despite the difficulties of predicting the outcome of a particular case, Rhodes concluded:
If all guilty plea cases went to trial, the percentage of prosecutions leading to conviction would
fall from eighty-seven percent to sixty-six percent (assault), ninety-three percent to eighty-two
percent (robbery), ninety-one percent to sixty-eight percent (larceny), and ninety-two percent
to sixty-eight percent (burglary).
Id. at 370 (footnote omitted). In another statistical study of the implicit rate of acquittal, Finkelstein
estimated that in districts with high guilty-plea rates, as many as one-third of all defendants pleading
guilty would have escaped conviction had they refused to plead. Finkelstein, supra note 27, at 309.
37. Many prosecutors feel justified in overrepresenting the strength of their cases because of the
possibility that a weak case will become stronger. See McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman, supra note
15, at 4-5.
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ity decisions that jeopardize the defendant's interests. The legitimacy of
those decisions depends on how accurately the probability of conviction is
assessed. Yet the subjective quality of those assessments makes it almost
impossible for third parties to police the conduct of individual prosecutors
and defense attorneys. With an increased flow of information to the defen-
dant," however, the defendant can protect himself to some extent against
abuses of power by prosecutors and defense attorneys. Although disclosure
may not ensure wholly fair dealing by prosecutors or fully committed rep-
resentation by defense attorneys,39 it permits the defendant to make an
independent evaluation of the strength of the case against him and thus to
challenge the prosecutor's and the defense attorney's representations about
the advisability of a plea bargain.
Some disclosure is therefore needed to prevent abuses in plea bargain-
ing. To determine whether and how much disclosure should be required,
it is necessary to examine the actual operation and the various legitimat-
ing conceptions of the guilty-plea process. That analysis indicates that a
requirement of very broad disclosure can justifiably be introduced to ad-
dress the problems caused by the imbalance in information.
II. The Basis of Legitimacy for the Guilty-Plea Process
The guilty-plea process is, on its face, a process that is intended to and
does in fact produce consensual transactions. Because it is part of the
criminal justice system, however, plea bargaining might also be thought to
serve the systemic goals of generating accurate determinations of factual
guilt and legal guilt. Although there is little consensus about the values
that the guilty-plea process should be made to serve,4" a demonstration
that plea bargaining serves either of these systemic goals, or the goal of
achieving meaningful consent to the resulting bargains, would lend consid-
erable legitimacy to the process. 1 Such a demonstration would also pro-
38. Because defense attorneys may inadequately counsel their clients about the likelihood of con-
viction, disclosure of information must be made directly to the defendant.
39. Prosecutors may treat defendants unfairly-if not unconstitutionally-in ways other than by
denying them adequate information. For example, they may exercise their charging discretion to pros-
ecute one defendant for an offense even though prosecution for that offense is otherwise rare or non-
existent. Similarly, defense attorneys may give inadequate advice to their clients even if full disclosure
is made to defendants. The defendant's relative lack of legal sophistication gives him little ground to
dispute the advice he receives.
40. C Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'y REV. 199, 203 (1979) (under-
lying normative issues of plea bargaining rarely treated in systematic fashion); Hyman, Bargaining
and Criminal Justice, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 3-4 (1980) (conflicting values inherent in criminal
justice system generate conflicting potential aims for plea bargaining).
41. To the extent that factual accuracy diverges from trial replication as an aim of the plea pro-
cess, achieving the latter would lend greater legitimacy to the process because the accurate determina-
tion of legal guilt is the fundamental aim of trial, the primary process for criminal justice. See
Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure. A Compara-
tive Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 583 (1973) (adversary system limits search for truth in order to
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vide direction for reforms: the process should be made to serve increas-
ingly well those goals on which its legitimacy rests.
Corresponding to each of the three legitimating goals is a conception of
the guilty-plea process that asserts that the primary function of the plea
process is to serve that goal. Two of the conceptions of the plea process
look beyond the bargaining that takes place and identify functions of the
process other than the production of consensual transactions. Under the
first conception, the primary function of the guilty-plea process is to repli-
cate the conviction results that would be obtained at trial; that is, to gener-
ate accurate determinations of legal guilt.42 If this conception were func-
tionally accurate, one would expect to find counterparts in the plea
process to many of the evidentiary and procedural rules that govern at
trial.43 Under the second conception of the guilty-plea process, the pri-
mary function of plea bargaining is to achieve accurate determinations of
factual guilt. 44 If this conception accurately characterized the function of
the plea process, one would expect to find counterparts to those elements
of an inquisitorial system that best serve accuracy." The third conception
of the guilty-plea process views it as the bargaining process that it pa-
safeguard against government abuse); Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 555, 557 (1979) (legitimacy of plea bargaining requires that it not conflict with aims of criminal
justice system).
42. See, e.g., Church, supra note 16, at 512 (properly constructed plea bargaining system should
approximate probable results of trial); Comment, supra note 7, at 529 (same); Note, Guilty Plea
Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 882 (1964)
(if plea bargained convictions could approximate trial outcomes, criticism of system would diminish
substantially).
43. Model guilty-plea laws, some federal courts, and at least four states have adopted conditional
guilty pleas in order to preserve Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for defendants who plead guilty.
See Note, supra note 3, at 565-66 nn.9-11.
44. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 16, at 158-63 (guilty plea is focal device of crime-control
model of criminal process); Hyman, Philosophical Implications of Plea Bargaining: Some Comments,
13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 565, 565 (1979) (plea bargains are less offensive when guilt is reasonably
certain); White, supra note 30, at 458-62 (plea bargaining guidelines should reflect sensitivity to
probable guilt or innocence of defendant, not merely relative chances of acquittal or conviction).
45. The criminal justice systems of civil-law nations provide a model for inquisitorial modes of
factual determination. Although civil-law systems do not incorporate guilty pleas in their criminal
processes, see Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Sys-
tems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 244 (1977), there are enough similarities that
comparisons are profitable. Among the similar features are the judge's direct questioning of the defen-
dant unconstrained by any privilege against self-incrimination, the judge's active participation in the
conviction of the defendant, and the admissibility of all relevant evidence regardless of extraneous
constraints such as those imposed by constitutional rights or by rules against prejudice. See Damaska,
supra note 41, at 514-25 (civil law generally does not recognize exclusionary rules barring hearsay,
prejudicial evidence, or evidence illegally obtained).
It is noteworthy, therefore, that in civil-law systems, "the defendant and his counsel acquire, before
the case comes up for trial, an unlimited right to inspect the whole investigative dossier." Id. at 533;
see Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 207-
08 (1979). The defendant must also reveal evidence to the prosecution. See Damaska, supra note 41,
at 533-36. Civil-law systems view open disclosure as promoting the accuracy of the truth-seeking
process; one commentator has also seen it as compensating the defendant for the relative lack of proce-
dural safeguards. See id. at 534-35 & 535 n. 64.
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tently is. Under this conception, the primary function of the plea process
is to produce agreements to which the government and the defendant have
both given meaningful consent." If this conception were functionally accu-
rate, one would expect to find counterparts in the plea process to the rules
of contract law that seek to protect the consensual character of
transactions."v
To provide an acceptable basis for the legitimacy of plea bargaining,"' a
conception of the guilty-plea process must identify as functions of the pro-
cess functions that the current plea process by and large actually serves; to
the extent that the process does not now perfectly serve the identified
functions, the conception must show how current practices can be re-
formed. This section argues that of the three conceptions of the plea pro-
cess that correspond to the three legitimating goals, only the consensual-
transaction conception either accurately characterizes the actual functions
46. Several commentators have concentrated their analysis and defense of plea bargaining on the
extent to which the bargains produced are consensual. See, e.g., Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness
and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 527 (1979) (defending plea bargaining
against charges that it is intrinsically coercive); Hyman, supra note 40, at 4-5 (describing plea bar-
gaining as negotiation and recommending that reforms of plea bargaining should stress congruity
between bargaining and trial process). The consensual-transaction conception of the guilty-plea pro-
cess singles out consent as the primary value in the plea process.
Although plea bargaining has been criticized for diluting the adversarial system, see, e.g., Note,
The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1395-98 (1970), some commen-
tators who focus on the defendant's consent praise plea bargaining for its cooperative quality, see
Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 576-
77 (1977) (plea bargaining offers defendant opportunity to participate in criminal process) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Transformation]; ce Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 108, 113, app. A (1967) (compromise in plea bargaining, not trial adjudication, may be best
way to prove elements of crime based on personal responsibility or other values).
47. Courts and commentators have expressly used the analogy between plea bargains and con-
tracts. E.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.6 (1977) (analogizing court's authority in guilty-
plea case to authority exercised in application of parol evidence rule); Cooper v. United States, 594
F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1979) ("[Alnalogies from contract law will usually provide a reliable inclusive
test for the existence of constitutional right and violation."); F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 587 (1980) (asking if plea bargains should be subject to constitutional equivalent of
unconscionability doctrine of U.C.C. § 2-302); Hyman, supra note 40, at 16-17 (litigation over
whether defendant received expected benefits from plea reflects notion of guilty plea as contract);
Kipnis, supra note 22, at 96 (plea bargains have many features of commercial contract); Westen &
Westin, supra note 6, at 528-38 (because Supreme Court has implicitly recognized constitutional
protection for defendants' expectations arising from plea bargains, commercial contract law should be
applied in guilty-plea cases).
Many other cases have used contract terminology and relied on contract principles. E.g., Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-63 (1971) (defendant is entitled to remedy for broken plea bargain;
sentencing court left with discretion to choose between remedies of withdrawal of plea or "specific
performance"); see note 115 infra (citing cases).
48. Developing a conception of plea bargaining that accurately identifies the values that legitimate
the process does not preclude criticism of plea bargaining on the ground that the identified values are
inadequate to justify a practice that defeats the more general aims of the criminal justice system.
Because plea bargaining is constitutional, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971),
and unlikely to be eliminated in the near future, reform efforts must rest on a clear understanding of
what values the plea process serves now and can be made to serve even better.
1592
Preplea Disclosure
of the guilty-plea process or suggests reforms that can make the character-
ization accurate. Analyzing the operation of plea bargaining reveals that
the plea process involves little of what the trial-replication and factual-
accuracy conceptions lead one to expect, and that neither conception can
be made accurate as a functional description by readily available reforms
of the process. As a consequence, the consensual-transaction conception is
the only adequate foundation for the legitimacy of plea bargaining.
A. The Operation of the Guilty-Plea Process
A plea bargain is struck when the defendant agrees to plead guilty in
return for an inducement offered by the prosecution. The benefit received
by the prosecution is the avoidance of the uncertainty, delay, and expense
of trial. The benefits most often obtained by the defendant are a favorable
sentence recommendation, dismissal of charges, and the opportunity to
plead to a lesser included offense."9
Although many plea bargains result from explicit, particularized nego-
tiations between the prosecution and the defense, some plea bargains are
the product of implicit arrangements incorporated formally or informally
into the criminal justice system. Such implicitly negotiated plea bargains
most commonly occur in jurisdictions whose judges routinely impose lower
sentences on guilty-plea defendants than on trial defendants. In that situa-
tion, the defendant, if informed of this sentencing practice, may be in-
duced to plead guilty without any encouragement from the prosecutor. 0
Those elements of the criminal process that are intended to encourage
or to reward guilty pleas are not the only ones that have that effect. Many
other elements of the process, though not designed for the purpose, oper-
ate to induce pleas of guilty;s" at a minimum, expected relief from such
systemic pressures enhances the value of any bargain implicitly or explic-
itly offered to the defendant. Perhaps the most common pressure of this
sort is felt by the indigent defendant who cannot make ball when arrested
on charges unlikely to bring a punishment more serious than probation or
a minimal prison sentence. Under these circumstances, the defendant may
spend more time in jail before trial than he would if he pleaded, and that
prospect may exert great pressure on the defendant to plead guilty. 2
49. Among other prosecutorial inducements are promises not to prosecute codefendants, promises
to incarcerate defendants or codefendants in particular prisons, agreements to prosecute defendants or
codefendants in juvenile court, agreements not to oppose probation, and promises of immunity with
regard to other charges pending or not yet filed. See Note, supra note 42, at 866 n.7.
50. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
51. The Supreme Court has recognized that the impact of implicit inducements differs little from
that of explicit inducements. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970).
52. See M. FEELEY, supra note 29, at 206 (noting "chilling effect" of pretrial detention on defen-
dants who cannot make bail); White, supra note 30, at 444, 450 (correlation between pretrial deten-
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Among the other unintended inducements to plead guilty are the high
financial costs and personal embarrassment of a public trial. 3
Implicit inducements to plead guilty pervade the criminal process; they
exist wherever unacknowledged practices or unspoken understandings
lead defendants to expect some benefit in return for a plea. Because im-
plicit plea bargaining thus eludes scrutiny,54 it is futile to try to distin-
guish between negotiated and non-negotiated pleas.55 The effects of plea
bargaining on a decision to plead are indistinguishable from the effects of
implicit inducements; for analytical purposes, therefore, every guilty plea
should be treated as an induced plea.
Although some defendants plead guilty without regard to any assess-
ment of the likely trial results,56 defendants typically consider a plea bar-
gain desirable only to the extent that it promises to reduce their exposure
to punishment after trial.5 7 That exposure is the particular sentence likely
to follow a verdict of guilty,"8 discounted by the chances of an acquittal. 9
tion and guilty pleas is particularly high in part because prosecutors can recommend "time-in"
sentences); Brill, Crime and No Punishment, AM. LAW., Jan. 1981, at 22, 25, 26-27 (one defendant
gave up probable dismissal of charges to get out of jail even though prosecutor considered seizure of
gun clearly illegal; another defendant accepted probation for double murder offense, though the judge
commented that defendant was crazy to settle even for that because key witness would not testify).
Pretrial detention contributes further to the high rate of guilty pleas both because jail-house defend-
ers are especially eager to please prosecutors and because the prospect of an indefinite period of
incarceration imposes psychological pressures on defendants to pin down a more certain release time.
See White, supra note 30, at 444, 450.
A final reason for the correlation of pretrial detention with a high rate of guilty pleas is that
preparation of a. trial defense is difficult when the defendant is in jail, especially when, as is usual, the
detained defendant lacks adequate resources for defense preparation. See D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, at 45-46 (1964).
53. See M. FEELEY, supra note 29, at 27.
54. See Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247, 253
(1979) (difficult to find evidence of pervasive implicit plea bargaining).
55. See Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 515, 526
(1975) (pleading guilty is tantamount to implicit plea bargaining); c. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S COURTS 19 (1977)
(28% of all guilty pleas in sample were made without explicit plea agreement, and in 21% of those
cases, defendants were allowed to plead to misdemeanor or to lesser offense).
56. Defendants may plead guilty to advantage codefendants or relatives, to end pretrial detention,
to avert the uncertainty of trial results, to avoid the embarrassing publicity of trial, or to minimize the
cost of legal counsel. Defendants may also plead guilty because they feel remorse or a sense of duty,
regardless of their chances of acquittal. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970); A.
ROSEr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 146 (1976). Disclosure by the prosecutor is significant
primarily when the defendant's decision to plead guilty depends on his chances of acquittal, but dis-
closure can also help the defendant evaluate the likely consequences for codefendants or relatives,
reduce the psychological costs of uncertainty, gauge the likely embarrassment of trial, and estimate the
cost of counsel. Disclosure may thus lead the defendant to demand greater consideration for his plea
even if the likelihood of acquittal is not the principal basis for his decision to plead.
57. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Enker, supra note 46, at 108-10.
58. This calculation should take account of elements of the penalty to be imposed other than the
sentence - for example, parole practices, stigma, and the collateral consequences of conviction. Thus,
the defendant's need for information is actually greater than is suggested by the simplification in the
text.
59. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Nagel & Neef, Plea Bargain-
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A defendant seeks a plea bargain incorporating a sentence less onerous
than the discounted trial sentence as he estimates it, and the prosecutor
offers pleas bargains tailored to her estimate of that discounted sentence."'
Typically, that is, the defendant's consent to a particular plea bargain
depends directly on his assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the
government's proof for the charges originally filed, just as the prosecutor's
offer of a particular plea bargain depends directly on her assessment of
those same strengths and weaknesses. By contrast, neither the defendant
nor the prosecutor is much, if at all, concerned with the evidentiary sup-
port for the charges to which the defendant ultimately pleads guilty."'
B. Three Conceptions of the Guilty-Plea Process
The literature on guilty pleas has given rise to three conceptions of the
guilty-plea process. One asserts that the primary function of the process is
the replication of trial results, the second that its primary function is the
achievement of factual accuracy, the third that its primary function is the
production of consensual transactions. Of the three conceptions, neither
the first nor the second accurately describes the guilty-plea process or sug-
gests simple reforms to increase the extent to which the process serves the
identified functions. The consensual-transaction conception does both, and
in doing so, provides a foundation for requiring preplea disclosure.
1. Trial Replication
Some courts and commentators have suggested that the legitimacy of the
guilty-plea process derives from its success in replicating the results of
ing, Decision Theory, and Equilibrium Models: Part I, 51 IND. L.J. 987, 991-93 (1976); Nagel &
Neef, Plea Bargaining, Decision Theory, and Equilibrium Models: Part II, 52 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Nagel & Neef (pt. 2)]; Zeisel, The Offer That Cannot Be Refused, in F. ZIMR-
ING & R. FRASE, supra note 47, at 558-59. A more sophisticated version of the defendant's calculation
would require estimation of a complete probability distribution, with probabilities assigned to a range
of possible penalties. Nothing is lost by using the simple product formula, however, because even in
the simpler version, the defendant needs information to assess a probability.
60. The higher the discounted trial sentence as the prosecutor estimates it, the higher the penalty
she seeks in a plea bargain. See Rossman, McDonald, & Cramer, Some Patterns and Determinants of
Plea-Bargaining Decisions: A Simulation and Quasi-Experiment, in PLEA-BARGAINING 77, 92 (W.
McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980); White, supra note 30, at 450-51; cf. Alschuler, supra note 11, at
59 (strength of state's case is relevant consideration in prosecutor's decision to plea bargain); Note,
supra note 42, at 901 (85% of prosecutors polled found that weaknesses in state's case provided signif-
icant inducement to plea bargain).
61. Because the defendant is primarily concerned with the strength of the prosecutor's proof for
the charges originally filed, the information sought by the defendant is distinct from the information
making up the factual basis for a plea. On appeal, a defendant may concern himself with the factual
basis for his plea in order to challenge the constitutional or statutory adequacy of the plea. Neverthe-
less, the presence or absence of an adequate factual basis has no necessary bearing on the quality of
his consent to plead guilty.
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trial. 2 In this view, the primary legitimating function of the plea process
is the same as that of trial: the accurate determination of legal guilt. The
guilty-plea process should convict those defendants who would be con-
victed at trial and should not convict those who would be acquitted at
trial. 3
]This conception of the guilty-plea process is inaccurate. The guilty-plea
process cannot be understood as serving to replicate the results of trial:
whereas the trial process is, by definition, competent to distinguish factual
from legal guilt, the current law on guilty pleas does not give effect to that
distinction. In fact, the present system persists in convicting defendants
who would not be convicted at trial.
6'
Evidence sufficient to establish legal guilt must be admissible at trial,
must be constitutionally seized, and must satisfy a high standard of proof.
The factual basis that is typically required for acceptance of a guilty
plea," however, need not satisfy any of these three requirements of legal
guilt. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure prescribes standards of admissibility. Hearsay testimony and un-
constitutionally seized evidence, for example, suffice to support a plea;66 in
fact, a summary of the government's case by the prosecutor is often
enough. 7 In addition, few jurisdictions have established any standard of
proof.6 Because the defendant's admission of guilt, which is highly unreli-
62. See note 42 supra. This conception adds a descriptive component to the prescriptions of those
commentators who recommend reform of the plea process to make it more accurately reflect trial
results.
63. One commentator has suggested a reform of the factual-basis requirement that would result in
a guilty-plea proceeding that could accurately be described as a mini-trial. See Barkai, Accuracy In-
quiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants? 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 88, 140-41 (1977) (directed verdict standard is appropriate evidentiary threshold for
factual basis determination).
64. See note 36 supra.
65. The federal courts and many state courts require a factual basis for acceptance of a plea. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(0; Barkai, supra note 63, at 89 n.6. Whether the Constitution similarly requires
a factual basis for every plea is an open question. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970),
the Supreme Court held that an admission of facts constituting a factual basis for the crimes pleaded
to was not an essential element of a constitutional plea. Although not squarely holding that an inde-
pendent factual basis was always needed in the absence of the defendant's admission, the Court relied
heavily, in finding the guilty plea voluntary and intelligent, on the factual showing the state had made
at the plea hearing. Id. at 38.
66. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (Advisory Committee notes to 1974 Amendment); Note, Revised
Federal Rule 11: Tighter Guidelines for Pleas in Criminal Cases, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1010, 1021-
25 (1976).
67. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (Advisory Committee Notes to 1974 Amendments) (inquiry of attor-
neys or examination of pre-sentence report might suffice); Barkai, supra note 63, at 118-20.
One commentator has suggested that Alford could have been given a more restrictive interpretation
because the procedure used was, as required by state law, more a mini-trial than a plea proceeding.
See Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102, 121
(1977).
68. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (not specifying standard of proof for factual-basis showing);
Barkai, supra note 63, at 122-27 (describing state and federal law). The American Bar Association
has proposed requiring a factual basis unaccompanied by a standard of proof. ABA PLEA STANDARDS,
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able,69 typically constitutes the principal evidence for the plea's factual
basis,"0 the absence of a standard of proof is a particularly striking indica-
tion that the factual basis requirement is an inadequate substitute for the
formal evidentiary showing required at trial. 1
With respect to other rights entailed by a commitment to the standard
of legal guilt, the guilty-plea process is an equally poor substitute for trial.
For example, the Supreme Court has drastically narrowed the scope of
legal challenges that must be allowed following a guilty plea." In fact,
guilty pleas may constitutionally be treated as waivers of most of the
rights available to trial defendants,73 and current practice treats them as
such. 4 The Supreme Court has also declined to require a full articulation
of those rights at the plea hearing, even though such a requirement would
help provide the defendant an adequate opportunity to assess his legal
guilt prior to conviction.7 Under present law, in short, the guilty-plea
process guarantees to the defendant few of the rights that render trial an
instrument for the determination of legal guilt. For that reason, and be-
cause pleas by legally innocent defendants are common," the guilty-plea
process cannot now be viewed as functioning to replicate the results of
trial.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the guilty-plea process can be reformed
to make the trial-replication conception even moderately accurate. Strin-
gent standards might be set for the character and amount of proof needed
to establish a factual basis for a plea, but negotiated pleas would continue
to respond to the uncertainties involved in predicting trial outcomes. Pre-
diction of trial results can never adequately substitute for trial as a means
supra note 2, at 30-34. By contrast, the American Law Institute has proposed a standard requiring
"reasonable cause"; that is, evidence sufficient to support a guilty verdict. MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.4(3) (1975) (cross-reference to definition of "reasonable cause" in
§ 330.5(3)).
69. Once a defendant decides that he is best off with a certain plea bargain, he has little incentive
not to supply the needed factual basis. Moreover, defense counsel is likely to advise him to admit guilt.
See Note, Transformation, supra note 46, at 574-75.
70. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (voluntary and intelligent admission
removes issue of factual guilt from case).
71. Some language in the Advisory Committee notes to the Federal Rules suggests that the fac-
tual-basis requirement was never intended to provide a check on the conviction of legally innocent
defendants. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendment) (require-
ment is intended to enable judge to ensure that defendant's conception of his offense corresponds to
legal definition of crime); Barkai, supra note 63, at 95-97 (many courts use factual-basis requirement
only to ensure that defendant understands offense pleaded to).
72. See note 3 supra.
73. One commentator has characterized the deprivation of rights suffered by defendants pleading
guilty as a forfeiture rather than a waiver. See Westen, Away from Waiver, supra note 3, at 1214-15.
74. See id. at 1219; Bishop, Waivers in Pleas of Guilty, 60 F.R.D. 513 (1974) (reviewing law on
waivers affected by guilty pleas).
75. See note 6 supra.
76. See note 27 supra.
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of determining legal guilt: key influences on trial outcome, such as jury
composition, legal representation, and witness availability, cannot be accu-
rately predicted. Negotiated pleas would also remain dependent on the
inducements offered by prosecutors, and both the Supreme Court's recog-
nition that the offer of inducements is an essential element of the plea-
bargaining process" and the current practice of offering greater induce-
ments as conviction becomes less likely"8 testify to the great disparity be-
tween the actual guilty-plea process and the process entailed by the ideal
of trial-replication.
2. Factual Accuracy
Because factual guilt is of concern to the criminal justice system,7' the
legitimacy of the guilty-plea process might be thought to derive from the
ability of that process to arrive at accurate determinations of factual guilt.
The Supreme Court has praised the accuracy of the guilty-plea process,"0
and some commentators have proposed reforms to make the process more
exclusively concerned with factual guilt. 1 Moreover, a conception of the
guilty-plea process that identifies the accurate determination of factual
guilt as its primary function can offer an explanation for the constitu-
tional requirement that every plea be intelligently made: the requirement,
it can be argued, helps to ensure the accuracy of the charges pleaded to. 2
This conception gives a similar account of the factual-basis requirement
77. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1978).
78. Rather than allocating to the guilty-plea process only the defendants most likely to be con-
victed, present prosecutorial practices seek to trigger defendants' consent in the weakest cases. See note
60 supra. If guilty pleas are intended to replicate trial results, the practice of offering more favorable
inducements as convictions after trial appear less probable further undermines the appropriateness of
using the defendant's consent as a mechanism to allocate defendants between the two processes of
conviction.
79. Accuracy is becoming an increasingly important value for the trial process as well. See Man-
son v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1977) (rejecting per se rule for constitutional identification in
part because rule might result in factual error); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) ("ultimate
question of guilt or innocence" should be central concern in criminal proceeding); Cover & Aleinikoff,
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1068-1100 (Burger Court
decisions stress factual guilt as concern of criminal justice system). But see Seidman, Factual Guilt
and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 436, 437 (1980) ("[Tlhe Burger Court's criminal procedure decisions are not consis-
tent with guilt-or-innocence model of criminal justice.")
80. In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam), the Court stated that "a counseled
plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite
validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case." Id. at 62 n.2 (emphasis in original); c. Note,
supra note 46, at 1397 (administrative determinations may be more reliable than those made by judge
or jury).
81. E.g., White, supra note 30, at 458 (plea bargaining guidelines should reflect sensitivity to
probable guilt or innocence of defendant and not relative chance of acquittal).
82. See Westen & Westin, supra note 6, at 501-03 (intelligence standard, which ensures notice of
charges and of procedural safeguards that are available at trial, guards against inaccurate guilty
pleas). But see id. at 503-04 (notice of guilty plea's consequences that is required by intelligence
standard "cannot be explained by any possible interest in the accuracy of guilty pleas").
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for the acceptance of a plea. 3
The principal support for the factual-accuracy conception, however,
comes from the resemblances between the guilty-plea process and inquisi-
torial processes, 4 whose hallmark is an overriding concern with the accu-
racy of factual determinations. 5 Inquisitorial systems ignore the accusato-
rial system's distinction between factual and legal guilt. In such systems,
defendants rarely exercise their privilege against self-incrimination, judges
take an active part in the trial process, and all relevant evidence is consid-
ered in the fact-finding process; all relevant evidence is also available for
scrutiny by both parties.8 6 In addition, judges often rely more heavily on
the dossier compiled by the prosecutor than on testimony given by wit-
nesses at a hearing.87 The plea process is similar in several respects. The
parties at the plea hearing do not face each other as adversaries, and no
rigid rules govern what evidence may be considered in establishing the
factual basis for the plea. Indeed, the plea hearing provides for direct par-
ticipation by the judge and permits the factual determination to be based
largely on the defendant's admissions or on the prosecutor's file." The
factual-accuracy conception infers from these similarities that the primary
function of the guilty-plea process is, like that of inquisitorial processes,
the accurate determination of factual guilt.8 9
83. Some language in the Advisory Committee notes suggests that the factual-basis requirement
helps ensure that the judge accepts a guilty plea only under circumstances that enable the judge to
determine that the defendant is in fact guilty of the crimes pleaded to. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f)
(Advisory Committee Notes to 1974 Amendment). But f. note 71 supra (other language in Advisory
Committee notes indicates that factual accuracy not primary concern of factual-basis requirement).
84. Although the analogy between guilty pleas and inquisitorial systems has been recognized,
Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1022-23 (1974), commentators differ on whether plea bargaining is practiced in
civil-law nations, compare Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 45, at 269-84 (plea bargaining is prac-
ticed in France, Germany, and Italy) with Langbein, supra note 45, at 206-12 (Germans do not
engage in plea bargaining).
85. See Damaska, supra note 41, at 578-87 (nonadversary process more committed to search for
truth than Anglo-American process).
86. See id. at 533.
87. See Goldstein, supra note 84, at 1018-19; Langbein, supra note 45, at 207-08.
88. The prosecutor's case may be presented to the judge through a witness's summary, see North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 (1970) (court heard testimony of police officer who summarized
state's case; defendant did not admit guilt), through the pre-sentence report, or through statements
made directly by the prosecutor. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (Advisory Committee Notes to 1974
Amendment).
89. A few jurisdictions offer the defendant a third alternative to trial or guilty plea: plead not
guilty and stand trial in an abbreviated form. Abbreviated trials of this sort are commonly associated
with the Los Angeles courts. See Mather, Some Determinants of the Method of Case Disposition:
Decision-Making By Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 187 (1973) (study of
Los Angeles courts). In abbreviated trials, judges base their determinations on transcripts of prelimi-
nary hearings, as well as on any additional evidence or arguments submitted. These proceedings are
considered substitutes for guilty pleas and often incorporate sentence bargains. Sometimes prosecutors
use these proceedings to dispose of a case by acquittal rather than by dismissal, if dismissal cannot be
justified to superiors. Id. at 202.
Occasionally, abbreviated trials are semi-adversarial in nature, the defendant choosing to concede
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Despite the similarities to inquisitorial fact-finding processes, however,
the guilty-plea process cannot be understood as functioning primarily, or
even to any significant degree, to achieve factual accuracy. One reason is
that the guilty-plea process differs from inquisitorial processes in respects
that are important for the pursuit of accuracy in determining factual guilt.
For example, whereas the law governing guilty pleas does not incorporate
any standard of proof, inquisitorial systems set a high standard." In addi-
tion, whereas guilty-plea law does not require disclosure of the prosecu-
tor's file, inquisitorial systems require the prosecutor to open her file to
the defendant and to the judge.' In some inquisitorial systems, too, gov-
ernment officials are under a statutory duty to investigate exculpatory and
inculpatory evidence, 92 a duty that has only insubstantial counterparts in
the guilty-plea process.93
A second, more important reason for the inadequacy of the factual-ac-
curacy conception of the guilty-plea process is that plea negotiations and
guilty-plea hearings in fact reward conduct that promotes inaccuracy. The
content of plea negotiations depends chiefly on the parties' subjective
views of the chances of trial conviction; neither party is concerned with the
likelihood that the defendant actually committed the offense pleaded to.'
4
Indeed, the offense of which the defendant is convicted commonly differs
from the offense committed." It is the consequences of the plea, not the
factual basis for it, that the prosecutor and the defendant seek to agree on.
some points and to contest others. See id. at 194-95. Most often, however, these proceedings take the
form of "slow pleas of guilty," see id., providing defendants who expect conviction with the benefits of
not having to make admissions of guilt and preserving rights of appeal. See Project, Marijuana Laws:
An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1499, 1559-60 (1968). Slow pleas of guilty are also common in Philadelphia, see Mather, supra,
at 190; White, supra note 30, at 444 n.25, and in Pittsburgh, see Levin, Urban Politics and Judicial
Behavior, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 206 n.26 (1972); Mather, supra, at 190. "Slow plea" proceedings
normally involve presentation by the defense of material relevant to sentencing. Guilt or innocence is
not actually in issue. See Levin, supra, at 206 n.26. The factual presentation may simply consist of
testimony stipulated to by defense in exchange for prosecutorial concessions. See White, supra note 30,
at 444 n.25. This most common form of alternative guilty-plea proceeding, then, is as little concerned
with factual accuracy and as much dependent on prosecutor-defendant agreement as the standard
guilty-plea proceeding.
90. See p. 1596 supra (few American jurisdictions have standard of proof for factual basis); J.
LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 78-79 (1977) (German law provides for
standard of proof substantially similar to guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
91. See note 7 supra (preplea disclosure not generally required in American jurisdictions); p. 1599
supra (inquisitorial processes generally require disclosure).
92. See Langbein, supra note 45, at 207-08.
93. But cf p. 1612 infra (commentators have recommended increasing prosecutor's obligations).
94. Notwithstanding that some defendants may plead guilty out of remorse, see note 56 supra,
and that some prosecutors plea bargain solely in order to convict the factually guilty, see note 17
supra, it is the likelihood of conviction that explains and motivates most plea bargaining, see pp.
1594-95 supra.
95. See L. WEINREB, supra note 18, at 57-58 (crimes underlying guilty-plea convictions are nor-
mally result of general assessment of evidence and tactical considerations rather than of close evalua-
tion of precise distinctions among possible crimes).
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When an agreement has been reached and the defendant pleads in
court, the hearing judge typically honors the plea bargain with only cur-
sory examination of its accuracy. Although the factual basis for a plea
must be established either by an admission of guilt or by independent
evidence," neither the Constitution nor the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure lays down any standard of proof to ensure the reliability of the
factual support.97 Most important, an admission by a defendant pleading
guilty is highly unreliable evidence: the judge typically does not probe the
defendant's recital of facts, and the defendant has a strong incentive to
lie.98 Finally, not only is the factual-basis showing immune from any stan-
dard of proof, but neither the Constitution nor any statute establishes
guidelines for the types of evidence that may contribute to that showing.99
In fact, the factual-basis requirement is designed not to transform the plea
hearing into a fact-finding proceeding, but to enable the judge to ensure
that the defendant's conception of his offense corresponds to the legal defi-
nition of the crime. 100
The guilty-plea process, therefore, cannot now be understood as func-
tioning to achieve accuracy in the determination of factual guilt. It is also
unlikely that the process can be reformed by relatively simple measures to
make the factual-accuracy conception substantially more accurate. In ad-
dition to requiring disclosure of the prosecutor's file in order to lay all
evidence open to examination, the law would have to establish a standard
of proof and rules of evidence for the inquiry into factual guilt, and the
judge would have to take a more active role in challenging the recital of
facts agreed to by the prosecutor and the defendant. Although such re-
forms might improve the accuracy of the plea process without altering its
fundamental character, it is doubtful that any reform could eliminate judi-
cial reliance on false admissions by the defendant without abolishing the
guilty plea itself.101 Moreover, it is unlikely that any reform of the law
could change the content of plea negotiations: regardless of the reform, the
prosecutor and the defendant would not focus on the factual accuracy of
the charged filed; they would continue to rely on their estimates of the
probability of trial conviction on the charges filed, and to bargain about
the consequences of conviction on the charges pleaded to."02 For those rea-
96. See notes 65 & 70 supra.
97. See note 68 supra.
98. See note 69 supra.
99. See notes 67 & 68 supra.
100. See note 71 supra.
101. Because an admission can remove the issue of factual guilt from a case, see note 70 supra,
and because defendants are typically willing to supply one, see note 69 supra, the plea process relies
heavily on admissions, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970) (pleas typically accompa-
nied by admission of guilt).
102. See pp. 1594-95 supra.
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sons, no reform of the guilty-plea process seems likely both to preserve the
character of the process and to render the factual-accuracy conception ade-
quate as an account of the legitimating goal of the process.
3. Consensual Transactions
In contrast to the trial-replication and factual-accuracy conceptions of
the guilty-plea process, the consensual-transaction conception seeks the
legitimating function of the process in its most obvious features. The es-
sential role of consent in pleading guilty and the focus on exchange in
negotiating a plea define the character of the plea-bargaining process.
Recognizing these defining characteristics, the consensual-transaction con-
ception of the guilty-plea process rejects the attempts to locate the legiti-
macy of the process in systemic concerns with factual and legal guilt. This
conception is superior to the trial-replication and factual-accuracy concep-
tions because it is reasonably accurate as a characterization of the function
of the plea process and because, to the extent that the process does not
now perfectly serve the identified goal, reforms can readily improve it.
Case law supports the emphasis on the defendant's consent as the pri-
mary basis for the legitimacy of plea bargaining. First, the idea of consent
underlies the constitutional mandate that guilty pleas be voluntary and
intelligent.10' As elaborated in the Brady trilogy,104 both conditions are in-
tended to guarantee the defendant a meaningful opportunity to make a
rational choice among the alternatives he faces."05 Second, in North Caro-
lina v. Alford'06 the Supreme Court relied heavily on the defendant's con-
sent as the primary justification for accepting negotiated pleas. Alford is
important because it represents a departure from the Court's traditional
103. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some
Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J.
683, 700-01 (1975).
104. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
105. Although the Supreme Court has never fully explained the meaning of voluntariness, the
Brady trilogy suggests that voluntariness incorporates the notion that the circumstances surrounding
the defendant's decision to waive trial should allow for his rational evaluation of the advantages of
pleading guilty over those of trial. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (noting no
evidence that "Brady was so gripped by fear" that he could not, with counsel, rationally weigh advan-
tages of trial against those of guilty plea); id. at 748 n.6 (because assistance of counsel critical to
intelligent assessment of relative advantages of guilty plea, uncounseled pleas scrutinized with special
care); id. at 754 (court found "no hazard of an impulsive and improvident response to a seeming but
unreal advantage").
The intelligence requirement also helps the defendant assess the value of his alternatives by ensur-
ing that he receives information with which to assess his chances of acquittal, such as notice of the
critical elements of the charges against him, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 647 n.18
(1976), and notice of the procedural safeguards available at trial, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 (1969). See note 82 supra (notice of charges and of procedural safeguards of trial protects against
inaccurate prediction).
106. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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notion that a guilty plea must be composed of both an admission of guilt
and consent to conviction." 7 In upholding the guilty-plea conviction, the
Court recognized that the defendant's proclamation of innocence created a
factual and legal dispute between the government and the defendant, a
dispute that remained unresolved even after the conviction.' 8 Relying in
part on the existence of an independent factual basis, however, the Court
held that despite the dispute, the conviction was constitutional because the
plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. 109 That holding implied that
the constitutional legitimacy of a guilty plea does not require that the fac-
tual predicate be either undisputed or established by trial; it was enough
in Alford that the defendant gave his consent."10
Subsequent to Alford, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged and
approved the practice of plea bargaining. In Santobello v. New York,"'
the Court officially recognized that defendants often plead guilty in reli-
ance on promises made by prosecutors;' 12 it therefore held that the validity
of the resulting guilty-plea conviction depends on the performance of those
promises."' In observing that the defendant's consent to plead guilty was
inextricably tied to a promise made by the prosecutor, the Supreme Court
invoked the idea of contract as the foundation for the legitimacy of guilty-
plea convictions. Indeed, although the Supreme Court has not formally
characterized the plea bargain as a legally enforceable contract, it has ex-
plicitly drawn on the law of contracts to formulate the law of guilty
pleas."" Several state and lower courts have followed suit,"' and one cir-
107. See id. at 32.
108. Id.
109. The Court announced the standard as "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelli-
gent choice," id. at 31, and emphasized that a knowing and intelligent waiver of trial rendered a plea
constitutional in the absence of an admission and despite a denial of guilt, id. at 36-38. The Court
noted the "strong factual basis" chiefly to support its conclusion that the plea at issue was intelligent.
Id. at 38.
110. Since Alford, the Supreme Court has suggested that the defendant's admission is sufficient to
guarantee the factual accuracy of the plea. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975)
(defendant's admission is so reliable in establishing guilt as to remove issue of factual guilt from case).
That suggestion is highly questionable. See note 69 supra. In any event, because Alford renders the
defendant's admission unnecessary and because the factual-basis showing need not meet any particular
standard of proof, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f), the factual accuracy of the plea cannot be considered
the basis of legitimacy for guilty pleas. Cf Satzburg, supra note 3, at 1279 (guilt not factor in
determining which rights are waived by guilty plea).
111. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
112. Id. at 260.
113. Id. at 262 ("[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled.")
114. E.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.6 (1977) (analogizing explicitly to law of
contracts in general and to parol evidence rule in particular); SantobelIo v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
263 (1971) (court suggests "specific performance" or withdrawal of plea as possible remedies for
broken plea promises).
115. E.g., Parlermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294-97 (2d Cir. 1976)
(upholding state challenge to consideration for plea bargain would offend fundamental fairness and
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cuit court has even held that the law of guilty pleas fully incorporates,
though extends beyond, the law of contracts." 6 Commentators, too, have
used contract principles to analyze and to criticize the plea-bargaining
process.1
Case law and commentary are not the only sources of support for the
consensual-transaction conception of the guilty-plea process; direct com-
parison with the two competing conceptions also provides support. One
important reason to prefer the consensual-transaction conception is that it
takes into account all phases of the guilty-plea process as it currently ex-
ists: negotiations between the prosecutor and the defendant, " 8 agreement
on the terms of the plea bargain," 9 and performance of the specified obli-
gations by the prosecutor and the defendant. 120 The trial-replication and
factual-accuarcy conceptions, by contrast, focus on the results of plea bar-
gaining to the exclusion of the bargaining process itself.
A second important characteristic of the consensual-transaction concep-
tion is that it accounts, in terms of the goals of the guilty-plea process, for
the means by which the criminal justice system allocates defendants to
that process. If guilty pleas are seen as contractual arrangements, legiti-
mate because the parties have willingly consented to summary conviction
proceedings, defendants who plead guilty may sensibly, even obviously, be
viewed as different in one important respect from defendants who do not
plead guilty: those who plead were promised consideration sufficiently val-
uable to compensate them for surrendering their chance to be acquitted,
whereas those who go to trial were not. In contrast, if the legitimacy of
guilty-plea convictions is seen as deriving from their replication of trial
results or from their factual accuracy, it remains unclear what distin-
guishes defendants who plead guilty from those who do not. Neither the
trial-replication nor the factual-accuracy conception of the guilty-plea pro-
contract principle of estoppel); Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 820 (Del. Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 893 (1977) (state may rescind promise prior either to entry of guilty plea by defendant or to any
action by him constituting "detrimental reliance" on the agreements); Chaipis v. State Liquor Auth.,
44 N.Y.2d 57, 64-65, 375 N.E.2d 32, 35-36, 404 N.Y.S.2d 76-80 (1978) (where defendant pleads in
reliance on prosecutor's representations, defendant is generally entitled to enforcement). But see
United States ex rel. Selikoff v. Commissioner of Correction, 524 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) (contract principles are "inapposite" to criminal proceedings).
For a catalogue of guilty-plea cases drawing on contractual principles, see Westen & Westin, supra
note 6, at 528-31.
116. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1979).
117. See note 47 supra.
118. See Kipnis, supra note 22, at 97-100 (plea bargaining akin to contract made at point of gun).
119. See note 139 infra (describing possible unconscionability restriction on bargain terms).
120. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (defendant entitled to remedy for
broken plea bargain). That only defendants, and not prosecutors, are entitled to enforcement of the
terms of the bargain does not defeat the contractual analogy. Rather, it has been suggested, the doc-
trine of unilateral contracts explains the disparity in entitlements. See Westen & Westin, supra note
6, at 525 n.189 (consideration given to prosecutors is not promise to plead guilty, but performance in
so pleading).
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cess justifies using the defendant's and the prosecutor's choice as an alloca-
tion mechanism.
121
A final advantage of the consensual-transaction conception of the guilty-
plea process is that it preserves and incorporates the priority of values
associated with the trial process. In this respect, it resembles the trial-
replication conception. The consensual-transaction conception incorporates
the distinction between legal and factual guilt by. recognizing that, in
pleading guilty, the defendant sacrifices legal protections associated with
trial and can therefore legitimately seek some consideration in return for
the sacrifice. Like the trial-replication conception, this conception identi-
fies as the goal of the plea process one that encourages the process, when
it errs, to do so on the side of guilty defendants; rather than leave abuses
of power unchecked or risk conviction of factually innocent defendants, it
weights the process in favor of defendants.
Despite that similarity, the consensual-transaction conception is supe-
rior to the trial-replication conception. Whereas the latter seeks to pre-
serve the values of trial by objectively comparing the results of the guilty-
plea process to those of the trial process, the former relies on the subjective
medium of the defendant's assessment and consent to reflect the likely re-
sults of trial. Because no objective standards are available to predict par-
ticular trial results with reasonable certainty, 122 the trial-replication con-
ception provides no effective way to identify and correct erroneous
convictions. In contrast, the consensual-transaction conception directs
courts to examine, not the probability of conviction, but the defendant's
opportunity to make his own rational assessment of the chances of trial
conviction. 23 Because any plea bargain depends on both the prosecutor's
and the defendant's predictions of the chances of trial conviction, the terms
of the guilty plea are likely to reflect an accurate assessment of the defen-
dant's legal guilt-as long, that is, as the defendant has had a meaningful
opportunity to make a rational prediction. 12  Moreover, the task of guar-
121. In fact, because legal guilt is more difficult to establish than factual guilt, there is no reason
to think that defendants would choose to enter the plea process if that process accurately determined
factual guilt. In contrast, if the trial-replication conception were accurate, defendants would not have
an incentive always to avoid the plea process. This conception, however, does not explain the use of
the defendant's choice as an allocation mechanism: the defendant may be induced by the prosecutor to
plead guilty precisely when acquittal at trial is likely. See note 60 supra.
122. See note 36 supra.
123. Under the contract conception, courts need not endeavor to assess the likelihood of the defen-
dant's conviction at trial. The bargain's terms distribute to the parties the risk of error that the guilty
plea misrepresents that likelihood. Compare Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970)
(guilty plea not unsound because defendant's "calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's
case") with 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 598, at 585 (1960) (error in probability determi-
nation is not ground for rescission when risk is consciously assumed).
124. See Nagel & Neef (pt. 2), supra note 59, at 43-44 (when information is shared by both
prosecution and defense, plea bargain is likely to reflect more accurate perception of probability of
conviction). That the results of the guilty plea process may reflect the likelihood of trial convictions
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anteeing that the defendant has that opportunity is judicially manageable,
especially if the guilty-plea process is reformed in obvious ways suggested
by the consensual-transaction conception. In particular, disclosure of rele-
vant information to the defendant would make the plea process serve even
better than it now does the goal of producing agreements to which the
defendant has given meaningful consent.
III. The Role of Disclosure
In large part because there is no other way to prevent the abuses due to
an informational imbalance in the criminal justice system, 25 most observ-
ers agree that some measure of prosecutorial disclosure is a condition of
the validity of guilty-plea convictions. Disagreement exists primarily over
the appropriate scope of disclosure. Whereas courts have recognized only
a narrowly drawn duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, t26 several com-
mentators have proposed a broader duty.2 7 If accepted as the basis for the*
legitimacy of the guilty-plea process, the consensual-transaction concep-
tion provides a rationale for instituting a broad preplea duty to -disclose to




does not imply that the same defendants who would be acquitted at trial would escape guilty-plea
conviction. Rather, it means that the guilty-plea conviction would reflect the probabilities of trial
conviction in the size of the sentence discount and in this manner would pay respect to the values
underlying the trial process.
125. See pp. 1584-88 supra (prosecutorial bluffing and inadequate defense counsel take advantage
of informational imbalance).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Fambo v.
Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 600 (W.D.N.Y.), afld, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977); Ray v. Rose, 373 F.
Supp. 687, 694 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 936 (1974). The limited view of obligatory disclosure originated with Supreme Court rul-
ings on suppressions in cases going to trial. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS § 3.6(4), at 57 (1973) (proposing duty of preplea disclosure coexten-
sive with Brady).
127. E.g., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 320.3(1) (1975); Church, supra
note 16, at 512; Goldstein, supra note 103, at 701; Hyman, supra note 40, at 67; Nagel & Neef (pt.
2), supra note 59, at 38, 38 n.70, 43-44.
128. The trial-replication and factual-accuracy conceptions of guilty-plea convictions might also
require some degree of prosecutorial disclosure, but neither would be likely to require disclosure
nearly as broad as the contractual conception. For example, the trial-replication conception might
simply adopt the present duty to disclose during trial, thus requiring disclosure of exculpatory evi-
dence that is material to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). If plea
hearings were considered fact-finding hearings roughly equivalent to inquisitorial proceedings, one
might argue for adoption of the civil-law practice of broad disclosure of inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence. On the other hand, one commentator has suggested that a commitment to a "search for
truth" would dispose of any reason for broad disclosure of matters having an impact on the persua-
siveness of the prosecution's case. Uviller, supra note 56, at 114 (defendant's confession of culpability
is not affected by weaknesses in prosecutions independent proof).
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A. The Justification for Disclosure
When informed of the evidence likely to be available at trial, the defen-
dant can decide, with the benefit of a full evaluation of the likelihood of
his acquittal, whether or not to stand trial. That opportunity to assess the
likelihood of acquittal may be the defendant's only protection against
prosecutorial and defense counsel power. Mandating disclosure would en-
sure the defendant that protection. It would also make the defendant's
consent more meaningful by promoting fairer bargains. In addition, a dis-
closure requirement would correct violations of some basic principles of
contract law made relevant to the legitimacy of plea bargaining by the
adoption of the consensual-transaction conception of the guilty-plea
process.
1. Empowering the Defendant
In many circumstances, the defendant's loss of an opportunity to make
an accurate prediction of trial results is equivalent to the loss of the only
effective safeguard against false or unfair conviction. Unlike trial, which
places numerous obstacles on the path to successful prosecution of the de-
fendant," 9 the guilty-plea process sets up few effective formal barriers to
conviction. Review of a guilty plea for voluntariness, intelligence, and a
factual basis rarely uncovers grounds for rejecting the plea.10 Indeed, the
defendant's decision to plead guilty virtually guarantees his subsequent
conviction."' Consequently, the only effective check on the prosecutor's
129. See note 1 supra.
130. See L. WEINREB, supra note 18, at 77-78 (actual plea of guilty is "a perfunctory exercise in
which formalities triumph over substance"); Note, supra note 46, at 1394 (without increased commit-
ment of judicial resources to investigation, unlikely that plea hearing will uncover inaccuracies in
counseled plea).
The intelligence standard is satisfied by a record that includes only a perfunctory statement by the
judge of only some of the defendant's constitutional rights. See note 6 supra. The requirement of
voluntariness is currently satisfied by a plea offered under any circumstances short of physical or
mental coercion; it is not violated by a plea offered under circumstances in which the advantages of
pleading guilty are of uncertain value. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). The
factual-basis requirement is apparently satisfied by a minimal evidentiary showing and provides virtu-
ally no protection to the defendant, who is typically prepared to make whatever admissions are needed
to guarantee acceptance of his plea. See note 69 supra.
131. Although judges have the discretion to reject guilty pleas on grounds other than constitu-
tional infirmity or inadequate factual basis, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (de-
fendant has "no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted," and court may reject one "in exercise
of sound judicial discretion"); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962) (defendant has no
"absolute right" to have guilty plea accepted), courts have generally taken a limited view of such
discretion, advocating deference to the prosecution's judgment of the public interest. See United States
v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512-15 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (trial court
exceeded bounds of its discretion in denying dismissal of charges and thereby frustrating plea agree-
ment where prosecution gave substantial reasons for dismissal and plea bargain not found to be
clearly contrary to public interest); United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621-22 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (noting presumption that U.S. Attorney's determination is to be followed "in the overwhelming
number of cases," held that trial court abused its discretion in rejecting plea to reduced charges with-
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power to obtain a conviction by plea, and on the defense attorney's readi-
ness to plead, is the defendant's own decision to hold out for a chance of
acquittal.
When making that decision, the defendant relies primarily on his as-
sessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence likely to be
presented at trial. Typically, however, the defendant's ability to make that
assessment is severely restricted by his relative lack of investigative re-
sources.13 2 Disclosure directly to the defendant of information bearing on
the likelihood of acquittal is therefore required to guarantee the defendant
meaningful protection against prosecutorial and defense counsel power
and abuse.
2. Producing Fairer Bargains
In addition to protecting the defendant against prosecutorial power, a
disclosure requirement would result in the striking of bargains that are
fairer to the defendant: they would more adequately compensate him for
what he gives up. If a defendant has less information than the prosecutor
from which to calculate the probability of conviction, the prosecutor may
obtain a plea bargain more favorable to the government than the defen-
dant might have agreed to if more fully informed. Insufficient information
forces the defendant to assess his chances of acquittal on the basis of inde-
pendently acquired information mixed with unfounded guesses made in
the face of uncertainty. Reliance on independently acquired information
may lead the defendant to believe that his chances of acquittal are lower
than in fact they are and may therefore result in his consenting to a bar-
gain that he erroneously believes compensates him for surrendering the
possibility of acquittal. In addition, uncertainty may lead the defendant to
accept conditions he would otherwise reject: he may be highly risk-
averse,"' he is unable to evaluate information that, if disclosed, might
count in his favor," 4 and he has no opportunity to prepare a defensive
strategy, whomever the information would favor. Of course, the defen-
dant's predicament is made even worse whenever the prosecutor engages
in bluffing and thereby skews further the defendant's estimate of his
chances of acquittal in order to induce him to accept a plea bargain.
Disclosure of information relevant to evaluating the probability of ac-
out both giving statement of reasons and finding agreement in conflict with public interest).
132. See note 10 supra.
133. E.g., Alschuler, supra note 11, at 81 (although defendant was advised of high probability of
acquittal due to likely inadmissibility of key evidence, defendant pleaded guilty to avoid even small
risk of trial conviction).
134. Prosecutors are more likely to refrain from disclosing evidence that weakens their cases than
evidence that strengthens them. In addition, undisclosed information of certain types, such as informa-
tion that a previously disclosed witness has become unavailable, routinely favors the government.
1608
Vol. 90: 1581, 1981
Preplea Disclosure
quittal would permit the defendant to insist on consideration commensu-
rate with his surrender of a chance of acquittal. The defendant receives as
consideration the difference between the discounted trial outcome and the
penalty set in the plea bargain. Overestimation of the discounted trial out-
come makes the consideration appear larger than it actually is, thus in-
ducing the defendant to accept a higher penalty. Increased disclosure
would discourage such overestimation and thereby produce fairer bar-
gains. As a result, the consent that the defendant gives when he pleads
would be freer and more fully informed, and in that sense, more
meaningful.13
3. Minimizing Duress and Mistake
Adoption of the consensual-transaction conception of the guilty-plea
process makes it appropriate to criticize any element of the process by
using those principles of contract law that seek to guarantee meaningful
consent. In particular, the contract-law doctrines of duress and mistake
lend strong support to the case for preplea disclosure.
Viewed as a consensual transaction, a plea bargain bears striking simi-
larities to a contract made under duress."' Taken to its logical conclusion,
the analogy between duress and the circumstances of plea bargaining
would entail abolition of the plea-negotiation process.5 7 Short of abolish-
ing plea bargaining, however, the doctrine of duress calls for substantial
disclosure by the prosecutor.
The exemplar of duress is the contract made at gunpoint. The gun-
man's victim is coerced to consent to an agreement by the threat of severe
harm. A defendant who is offered a plea bargain is in a similar predica-
ment. By accepting the offer, he can limit his punishment to a certain
smaller penalty. Yet he is forced to make the choice under the threat that
a substantially greater sentence might be imposed should he stand trial.
The force of duress increases with the credibility and magnitude of the
threat relative to the offer; in particular, the higher the possibility of con-
viction, the stronger the duress. The prosecutor can therefore inflate the
pressure to plead guilty by misrepresenting the strength of the govern-
135. Disclosure may also make the plea process more accurate at determining legal guilt. In part
because defendants, when deprived of relevant information, overestimate the expected sentence differ-
ential between trial and plea, the guilty-plea process inadequately guards against the conviction of
legally innocent defendants. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 US. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155, 158 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847
(1968); Alschuler, supra note 11, at 62-63.
136. See Kipnis, supra note 22, at 96-101.
137. Id. at 100-01. Duress is a complete defense to performance of a contract, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 316-317 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1976), and would consequently provide
every defendant with a defense to his guilty plea conviction.
1609
The Yale Law Journal
ment's case; that is, by bluffing.138
Under such circumstances, prosecutorial disclosure of relevant informa-
tion would diminish the apparent likelihood of the threatened punishment
and thereby reduce the coercion inherent in the choice confronting the
defendant. Of course, disclosure would not aid the defendant who is very
likely to be convicted and severely punished. 39 Frequently, however, it is
precisely when their cases are weakest that prosecutors offer the greatest
sentence reductions, thus increasing the threat of the possible trial sen-
tence. In those cases, disclosure would substantially reduce the apparently
great disparity between the penalty offered and the likely trial result. Al-
though the existence of systemic pressures to plead guilty140 make it im-
possible to eliminate elements of duress altogether, disclosure can signifi-
cantly reduce the extent and degree of duress in the guilty-plea process. " ,
Like the law of duresss, the contract doctrine of unilateral mistake sup-
ports the introduction of a disclosure requirement into the plea-bargaining
process. The law of unilateral mistake has long grappled with the prob-
lem of contracts made between parties with unequal access to relevant
information. The case law offers seemingly conflicting positions on
whether a party with superior information has a duty to disclose material
facts to a less informed party.142 The two strains of cases may be recon-
ciled, however, by the principle that a party possessing material informa-
tion must disclose it if the information was acquired casually, but not if
138. See pp. 1584-87 supra. As trial conviction appears more certain, the sentence likely to follow
trial is subject to a smaller discount, and the disparity between the negotiated sentence and the trial
sentence therefore increases.
139. Perhaps the equivalent of an unconscionability rule might be invoked to protect the defen-
dant from the threat presented by genuinely excessive disparities in sentence alternatives. See F.
ZIMRING & R. FRASE, supra note 47, at 587 (suggesting possibility of applying equivalent of U.C.C.
§ 2-302 to plea process). Alternatively, charging guidelines might be instituted incorporating a prohi-
bition against offering excessive charge reductions. See Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 733, 792-93 (1980) (proposing guidelines for charge reductions that would guard against
offering greatest reductions to defendants whose factual guilt is doubtful). In this manner, disclosure
and an unconscionability principle together might police against prosecutors offering a plea bargain
that "cannot be refused." See Zeisel, supra note 59, at 558 (chapter titled "The Offer That Cannot
Be Refused").
140. See pp. 1593-94 supra.
141. Although grounded in tort and not contract, the law of informed consent offers additional
support for a requirement that superior information gatherers make disclosures to ensure the consen-
suai quality of the underlying transaction. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (physicians violate their duty to
patients when they withhold any facts required "to form the basis of an intelligent consent" to pro-
posed treatment). Guilty pleas are analogous to consent to medical treatment in at least three respects:
the relationship between the parties is more grave than a commercial relationship; the defendant, like
the patient, is making a stressful decision of overwhelming importance for his whole life; and the
prosecutor, like the doctor, possesses superior knowledge. One potentially significant difference is that
the doctor's responsibilities are entirely to his patient, whereas the prosecutor's responsibilities are at
least as much to the public as to the defendant.
142. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 123, § 608, at 669-70.
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the information was the fruit of a deliberate search. 43 This principle per-
mits superior information gatherers to be compensated for the costs of
their searches, but does not mandate extension of a bonus to those infor-
mation gatherers who came by their information .without special search
expenditures.
At first glance, prosecutors may appear to fall in the category of delib-
erate information gatherers. As such, they would be entitled to the value
of the fruits of their search, and the principle of unilateral mistake would
not compel them to disclose their superior information because to do so
would deprive them of its value. Despite the initial plausibility of this
view, however, a close look at the rationale for the distinction between
deliberate and casual information gatherers suggests that the fruits of
prosecutorial investigations should be disclosed to defendants.
The rule distinguishing deliberate from casual information gatherers at-
tempts to reduce the total cost of information without reducing the overall
quantity of information gathered.144 Thus, although disclosure of the fruits
of deliberate searches made by superior information gatherers would re-
duce the cost to other parties, and hence the overall cost, of acquiring that
information, the rule does not require disclosure under those circum-
stances because to do so would diminish or destroy the gatherer's incentive
to undertake the search.145 In contrast, the rule does require disclosure by
casual information gatherers because they would engage in the activity
that produces the information whether or not they expected to receive a
benefit for discovering it. 46 In other words, the rule of disclosure in the
law of unilateral mistake distinguishes those information gatherers who
need a special incentive to gather the information from those who do not.
If, therefore, the prosecutor would undertake investigations into the evi-
dence available for trial without regard to the existence of a duty to dis-
close the fruits of those investigations, the prosecutor should be obliged to
disclose that information to the defendant. Any other result would unnec-
essarily increase the costs of the system-both the costs the defendant
would have to incur to collect the information himself and the costs to
society of convicting defendants who are legally innocent.147 That a duty to
disclose can operate only in one direction does not affect this conclusion.
143. See Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contract, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 9 (1978).
144. Id. at 33.
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id. at 15-16. A classic example of casually acquired information is a contractor's discovery of
an error in a bid upon routine comparison with the other bids received. Id. at 32.
147. Game theorists, as well as other observers of the guilty plea system, have argued that in-
creased sharing of information during plea bargaining would tend to produce results that more closely
approximate the results of trial. See Nagel & Neef (pt. 2), supra note 59, at 43-44; Church, supra
note 16, at 512-13.
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Because even a defendant with superior information cannot constitution-
ally be required to make extensive disclosures,' the costs that result from
the defendant's nondisclosure, including the costs of prosecutorial investi-
gations, must be seen as necessary to prevent violations of constitutional
rights that would be still more costly. In any case, even unilateral disclo-
sure would decrease costs without reducing the quantity of evidence pro-
duced-provided that prosecutors are subject to incentives to gather the
information independent of their having to disclose what they collect.
There are several reasons to believe that even a broad obligation to
disclose would not dramatically weaken the incentives that currently moti-
vate prosecutors to undertake searches for relevant evidence prior to plea
bargaining. First, prosecutors have a legal duty to collect some evidence
before filing charges or appearing at a preliminary hearing or before a
grand jury,"9 and there is growing support for increasing the rigor of this
duty."'0 Some courts have even suggested that under certain circumstances
prosecutors are legally obligated to assist in the discovery of exculpatory
evidence."' 1
In addition to the legal duty, there are practical reasons that prosecu-
tors would collect evidence prior to plea bargaining despite broad disclo-
sure policies. Case files and police reports provide prosecutors with sub-
stantial information at an early stage in the prosecution without any
148. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (protection against self-incrimination
basic to constitutional system). Most jurisdictions with extensive discovery provisions require limited
pretrial disclosure by the defendant of documents, tangible items, and scientific reports that he intends
to introduce at trial. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A), (B); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(4), (5)
(West 1971). Some jurisdictions require disclosure of defense witnesses under specified circumstances.
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(3), (8) (West 1971 & Supp. 1980).
149. The amount of evidence necessary to justify filing of criminal charges is not expressly pro-
vided for by law. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 907-08. "Probable
cause," however, has been suggested as the appropriate standard. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-103A (1969).
Moreover, in most jurisdictions prosecutors must possess sufficient evidence to satisfy the eviden-
tiary standards applicable at a preliminary hearing or before a grand jury. Most jurisdictions adopt a
probable-cause standard for preliminary hearings and require presentation of a prima facie case to
grand juries. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 989-92.
150. Several commentators have argued for application of the prima-facie-case standard to prelim-
inary hearings. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.5 (1975); Arenella, Re-
forming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without
Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 473 (1980); Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in
Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 780 (1974) (proposing directed-acquittal standard,
which is equivalent to prima-facie-case standard).
151. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF CT. § 741(6) (1980) (granting defense right to conduct own
scientific tests on physical evidence obtained by prosecution); Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744,
746 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant has constitutional right to have own ballistics expert examine alleged
murder weapon); Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71, 75, 288 So. 2d 826, 830 (1973) (defendant entitled to
independent testing of substance underlying charge for narcotics possession). One commentator has
suggested that the Supreme Court establish rules encouraging complete investigations prior to plea
bargaining. Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 1282.
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special prosecutorial inquiries.1 12 Moreover, prosecutors have an incentive
to search for incriminating evidence even though they thereby run the risk
of discovering evidentiary weaknesses as a by-product of their investiga-
tions. Prosecutions rely heavily on disclosing their strong evidence to ob-
tain favorable plea bargains.5 3 Were they intentionally to forego collecting
evidence for fear of discovering weaknesses that would have to be dis-
closed, they would lose a considerable portion of their power to obtain
favorable plea agreements. Defendants could demand higher concessions
or would simply stall negotiations long enough to force prosecutors to un-
dertake investigations in preparation for trial. Thus, even if they were
subject to a duty to disclose, prosecutors would continue to search for in-
criminating evidence in order to ensure early and favorable disposition of
cases.
How to maintain prosecutorial incentives to discover evidence that ex-
culpates, rather than inculpates, the defendant is at first glance a more
difficult problem. Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that intro-
duction of a broad disclosure obligation would not significantly alter pre-
sent prosecutorial practices. First, many prosecutors already recognize a
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining." 4 Second,
because one of the principal advantages of plea bargains is the avoidance
of costly investigations, many prosecutors currently postpone pursuing ex-
culpatory leads until necessary for trial preparation."' Thus, exculpatory
leads are not often pursued if the defendant pleads guilty. As a conse-
quence, a disclosure requirement would be unlikely to reduce current
prosecutorial efforts to conduct preplea exculpatory investigations.
A final reason for requiring disclosure under the law of unilateral mis-
take is that to do so may well increase general investigative efforts, not
decrease them. Prohibiting prosecutors from hiding weaknesses in their
cases may give them an incentive to search for additional evidence to com-
pensate for those weaknesses. That incentive would be strongest when the
government's case is weakest, that is, when further investigation is most
152. See L. WEINREB, supra note 18, at 58 (police report is most significant source of prosecutor's
information). Even when case files and police reports did not provide particularly detailed information
about the quality of evidence available, such as the particular stories told by witnesses or the results of
scientific tests, the disclosure of information constituting investigative leads would give rise to some
speculation about the strengths and weaknesses of the government's case and would deter the prosecu-
tor from presenting her case as more fully developed than it actually is.
153. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 66 n.47.
154. See McDonald, Cramer, & Rossman, supra note 15, at 6-7 (prosecutors feel obliged to dis-
dose information indicating factual innocence); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 112, 136-37 (1972) (prosecutors disclose evidence favorable to
defendant more often than Brady requires partly out of sense of duty).
155. See Westen, supra note 3, at 1324 n.57 (key purpose of plea bargaining is to avoid necessity
of making extensive preparations required for trial). But see Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 1282 (not
clear that prosecutor plea bargains before investigations are complete).
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warranted and mistakes most need to be avoided. Disclosure may there-
fore be more likely to reduce the costs of mistake in the plea process than
to raise them.
B. The Scope of Disclosure
The scope of obligatory disclosure must be defined by reference to the
functions that a disclosure requirement in the guilty-plea process is
designed to serve. Among those functions are checking prosecutorial power
and neutralizing inadequate defense counsel, producing fairer bargains
and thereby making the defendant's consent more meaningful, and mini-
mizing both the duress inherent in the plea-bargaining system and the
costs of mistake caused by an imbalance in information. Mandatory dis-
closure serves all of those functions by enhancing the defendant's opportu-
nity to assess the likely results of trial. The duty to disclose must therefore
be broad enough to guarantee the fullest possible opportunity to make an
accurate assessment. That requirement entails a broad duty to disclose.
Broad mandatory disclosure represents a marked departure from the
current case law on preplea disclosure. Courts have generally looked to
the case law on pretrial disclosure 16 for guidance in giving content to a
duty of preplea disclosure. ' As a result, courts have addressed only the
problem of nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence.' They have not yet
squarely faced the problem of defining a standard for review of guilty-
156. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (right to fair trial entitles defendant to disclo-
sure of exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment). In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976), the Court gave content to the standard of materiality proposed in Brady. Agurs established
three different tests for materiality applicable in three different trial contexts: when the prosecution's
case includes perjured testimony, the suppression is material if "there is any reasonable likelihood that
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury," id. at 103 (footnote omitted); when
the defense has previously requested the omitted evidence, the evidence is material if it "might have
affected the outcome of the trial," id. at 104; when the defense makes no request or a general request
for Brady material, the suppression is material if it "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist," id. at 112.
Justice Marshall argued in dissent that because the last test sets a high threshold of materiality, it
must be understood as focusing on the judge's assessment of the defendant's guilt and not on the jury's
judgment. Id. at 117-18. The majority's reference to the trial judge's opinion of the defendant's guilt
supports Justice Marshall's characterization of the third test. After identifying the materiality test
appropriate for use in Agurs, which involved an appeal from a jury trial, the Court wrote:
It is. . . the standard which the trial judge applied in this case. He evaluated the significance
of Sewell's prior criminal record in the context of the full trial which he recalled in detail
.... [T]he trial judge indicated his unqualified opinion that respondent was guilty ....
[Tihe trial judge remained convinced of respondent's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ....
Id. at 113-14.
157. E.g., Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 596-98 (S.D.N.Y.), alfd, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.
1977) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976)); Chilli v. Dalscheim, No. 77-4406 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1979) (citing Brady); People v. Jones,
44 N.Y.2d 76, 79-80, 375 N.E.2d 41, 43, 404 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978)
(citing Brady and Agurs).
158. See People v. Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76, 81-82, 375 N.E.2d 41, 43-44, 404 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88-89,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978) (cases have not addressed general preplea disclosure problem).
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plea convictions, a problem distinct from the disclosure problem that
arises when reviewing trial convictions."5 9
Although a disclosure requirement restricted to exculpatory evidence
has been criticized as too narrow a rule even for trial,16 there is at least
some reason to single out exculpatory evidence for disclosure in the trial
context. Whereas the trial defendant can be certain that the government's
inculpatory evidence will be disclosed to him and to the factfinder some
time prior to conviction, if only because the government must present its
case at trial, he cannot be certain, absent a policy of mandatory disclosure,
ever to receive exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor. By contrast, at
the plea-negotiation stage, the prosecutor may not disclose either inculpa-
tory or exculpatory evidence to the defendant unless subject to a diclosure
duty. If the defendant pleads guilty, therefore, neither he nor the court
may ever have the opportunity to inspect the strengths and weaknesses of
the evidence that the prosecutor would have presented at trial. Denial of
that opportunity leaves the defendant without the information he needs in
order to make an accurate assessment of likely trial results. In the guilty-
plea context, disclosure of exculpatory evidence is not enough.
To fulfill the purposes of preplea disclosure, the duty to disclose should
reach all evidence that is material to the defendant's chance of acquittal.
The prosecutor should therefore be required to disclose all evidence likely
to be presented at trial, whether the evidence tends to inculpate or excul-
pate the defendant. The prosecutor should also have to disclose any evi-
dence, such as impeachment evidence, that strengthens or weakens the re-
liability of material evidence. In addition, the prosecutor should be obliged
159. One possible exception is Fambo v. Smith, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977). Although the Sec-
ond Circuit did not articulate a standard of review, it suggested considerations that are relevant to
review of the constitutionality of guilty-plea convictions.
In Fambo, the Second Circuit affirmed a guilty-plea conviction for possession of dynamite where
the prosecutor had not previously disclosed that the police had destroyed the dynamite before the date
cited in the charge to which the defendant pleaded guilty. The Court noted thai there was a factual
basis for the charge of conviction, that the defendant got what he bargained for, and that he was guilty
of the charge for which he was sentenced. Id. at 235. The Court also pointed out that the destruction
of the evidence would not have proved fatal to the prosecution's proof, that Fambo had indisputably
possessed the dynamite on or about the date in the indictment, id., and that Fambo never contended
that he was prejudiced by his ignorance of the dynamite's unavailability for trial, id. at 235 n.2.
These considerations lend themselves to two different constructions of the appropriate standard of
review. The court's reliance on the indisputability of Fambo's possession of dynamite reflects its con-
cern with the factual accuracy of the conviction and suggests a narrow standard of review consistent
with the current law on trial disclosure. See note 156 supra. At a minimum, disclosures regarding the
availability of evidence at trial would not be required under this standard of review.
A second construction of Fambo suggests a broader standard of review, comporting with that pro-
posed in this Comment. The court's reference to Fambo's failure to claim prejudice from the nondis-
closure of the unavailability of evidence, and its conclusion that the destruction of the dynamite would
not have proved fatal to the prosecution's proof, reflect a concern with the impact of the undisclosed
information on the defendant's prediction of the likely trial outcome.
160. E.g., Comment, supra note 154, at 135-40.
1615
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 1581, 1981
to give the defendant any information that bears on the availability or
admissibility of evidence at trial, 6 ' as well as any information that may
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 162 Finally, because it is the
penalty actually imposed that the defendant principally cares about, the
prosecutor should also be required to inform the defendant of whatever
information she may make available to a sentencing judge. 
6 3
This broad duty of disclosure should be enforced on review of guilty-
161. But see People v. Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76, 82-83, 375 N.E.2d 41, 44-45, 404 N.Y.S.2d 85, 89,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978) (failure to disclose death of complaining witness does not constitute
nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence and therefore, where defendant did not protest his innocence,
does not constitute denial of due process).
The reluctance of courts to require disclosure of information pertaining to the unavailability of
evidence for trial is particularly striking when the evidence in question has been previously disclosed
to the defendant as part of the prosecutor's proof, as in Jones, id. at 78-79, 375 N.E.2d at 42, 404
N.Y.S.2d at 86. Under such circumstances, there is little difference between nondisclosure and misrep-
resentation on the part of the prosecutor. But c. id. at 81, 375 N.E.2d at 44, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (all
reported instances of prosecutorial deceit involved positive misrepresentations; none considered effect
of silence only). Affirmance of guilty-plea convictions despite such prosecutorial conduct can be ex-
plained as a response to courts' preoccupation with the factual accuracy of the conviction. Because the
unavailability of evidence does not affect its persuasive force, nondisclosure of such information does
not threaten the accuracy of the guilty plea. See id. at 82, 375 N.E.2d at 44-45, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
162. Courts have generally refused to consider disclosure of exculpatory leads to be within the
Brady rule of disclosure, although such leads are arguably exculpatory and material to guilt. Cf
Comment, supra note 154, at 118 (challenges to convictions generally fail when claim is that disclo-
sure was belated).
163. This information primarily includes evidence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances sur-
rounding the charged offenses, regardless of their relevance to the matters that would be at issue at
trial. C Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1963) (suppression of evidence that was material to
punishment, but not to guilt or innocence, violated due process). It need not include material not
exclusively within the possession of the prosecutor. Therefore, although knowledge of sentencing and
parole criteria is necessary to make an accurate sentence prediction, such information is not within the
disclosure duty because it is public and equally available to prosecutors and defense attorneys. See,
e.g., United States Parole Commission Paroling Policy Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1980); United
States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 314 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975) (in imposing sentence, judge may consider
activities underlying charges of which defendant was acquitted). Even if it becomes apparent that
defense attorneys are not advising their clients of the consequences of such criteria, the court, not the
prosecutor, should disseminate such legal information.
Disclosure of mitigating and aggravating circumstances surrounding the crimes charged has partic-
ular significance for defendants pleading guilty in jurisdictions where sentencing and parole decisions
are made according to real-offense criteria. See, e.g., United States Parole Commission Paroling Pol-
icy Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(d) (1980). Real-offense criteria take into consideration the facts
involved in the actual offense committed regardless of their relevance to the charges of convictions.
The consequence is that defendants often receive sentences whose severity is consistent more with the
offense initially charged than with the reduced charges or sentence recommendation underlying the
plea bargain. See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Parole Release Guidelines, 51 U. COLO. L. REV.
237, 241 (1980).
In these cases, the unwary defendant is partially deprived of the benefit of his bargain. See id. at
241-42 (highly likely that defendants view real-offense sentencing as undermining their benefits from
plea bargain). But see id. at 241 (Parole Commission believes plea bargain's purpose is to limit range
of possible punishment). If the defendant is aware of what evidence sentencing judges or parole boards
are likely to possess, see Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE
L.J. 810, 879 (1975) (federal probation authorities normally obtain factual description of offense from
U.S. Attorneys), he can more accurately predict the sentence or parole termination date he is likely to
receive; he can then use that prediction in deciding whether to plead guilty. In this manner, broad
disclosure can mitigate the unfavorable consequences real offense criteria have for the consensual
nature of the plea bargain.
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plea convictions by a stringent standard.2 " Because the duty is designed to
guarantee the defendant a full opportunity to assess the likely trial results,
and therefore to insist on adequate consideration for his plea, any failure
to disclose information should be deemed a material breach of the prose-
cutor's duty if disclosure of that information would have so altered the
defendant's assessment of his chance of acquittal that he might not have
accepted the terms of the plea agreement. In applying this standard, re-
viewing courts should adopt a strong presumption that any undisclosed
information affected the terms of the agreement. Judgments in hindsight
that the undisclosed information was merely cumulative or evenly bal-
anced should not be allowed to rebut the presumption that the defendant's
view of his alternative would have been influenced by his knowing the
information. Only so strong a standard can enforce the duty to disclose by
preventing prosecutors from routinely asserting harmless error."'
IV. The Consequences of Preplea Disclosure
The proposed duty to disclose might evolve into a requirement that
prosecutors open their files to the defense. The acceptability of so broad a
disclosure duty depends ultimately on the effects it would have on both the
plea process and the trial process. Those effects, of course, cannot be fully
known without actual experience with a duty to disclose. Nonetheless,
some analysis of the likely consequences is possible. That analysis indi-
cates not only that prosecutors are likely to maintain present investigative
efforts,166 but also that both the effects on the plea process and the effects
on trial disclosure are likely to be acceptable.
164. To provide an adequate record for review, written summaries or copies of all information
disclosed to the defendant should be filed with the clerk of the court.
165. This standard for enforcement of the disclosure duty leaves enforcement relying to some
extent on the ability of interested parties to catch prosecutors with undisclosed information. Like
duties of pretrial disclosure, a preplea disclosure duty must rely on that uncertain mechanism for
enforcement: a mechanism that intruded more on prosecutors' functions would probably be unwise
and burdensome to courts. Cf Note, A Defendant's Right to Inspect Pretrial Congressional Testi-
mony of Government Witnesses, 80 YALE L.J. 1388, 1402 n. 67 (1971) (in camera judicial inspection
of evidence would require great time expenditure for judge to make accurate materiality determination
and might compromise judicial impartiality).
In addition, this standard does not permit prosecutors to excuse nondisclosure because of a need to
protect witnesses-even if the need could be proved to a judge's satisfaction. The consensual-transac-
tion conception of the guilty-plea process makes this result unavoidable because it demands that the
defendant have the opportunity to assess the likely trial results, which depend on the availability of
witnesses, their willingness to attend, and the defendant's ability to force and prepare for a confronta-
tion with those witnesses. When witnesses need protection, the prosecutor can force the defendant to
stand trial, thereby delaying disclosure of the witnesses' names and addresses. See p. 1621 infra.
166. See pp. 1612-13 supra.
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A. Effects on the Plea Process
Broad preplea disclosure might reduce the leverage of prosecutors and
therefore result in fewer convictions by guilty plea. Even if that is so,
however, the reduction that might occur is unlikely to be objectionable. In
the present system, the defendants most likely to be granted the privilege
of disclosure are those against whom prosecutors have strong cases167 and
those who are represented by defense attorneys trusted or liked by the
prosecution.168 Thus, it is generally only when the government's case is
weak or when the defense attorney is handling the case vigorously and not
cooperating with the prosecutor that evidence remains undisclosed. A dis-
closure duty would therefore have its principal effect on guilty-plea rates
in these two circumstances. In both situations, however, the change of cur-
rent practices would be justified. Weak cases, of course, present precisely
the circumstances under which disclosure is most needed. And cases in
which the privilege of disclosure is denied because of a special rapport
between the defense attorney and the prosecutor represent arbitrariness in
the guilty-plea system at its worst. 69
Although whatever decline preplea disclosure may cause in the number
of guilty pleas would therefore be justified, there are good reasons to be-
lieve that no substantial decline would occur. In many cases, prosecutors
already open their files to the defense.17 In additon, many risk-averse de-
fendants would continue to plead guilty despite disclosures of significant
weaknesses in the government's case.171 Finally, many of the inducements
to plead guilty offered by the criminal justice system are valuable inde-
pendent of the defendant's likelihood of acquittal;"7 a duty to disclose
would not affect these inducements.
173
If introducing a disclosure duty is likely to affect the number of guilty
pleas in justifiable and insubstantial ways, it is also likely to cause no
substantial increase in delay in the plea process. There is already much
disclosure in the plea process."7 Moreover, unlike civil discovery, which
167. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 66 n.47.
168. See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1229.
169. Cf Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 293-95 (1972) (disparities of
wealth and knowledge lead to disparate treatment of defendants).
170. See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1224-29 (prosecutors commonly disclose evidence to public
defenders, to defense attorneys with whom they have good rapport, and to defendants whose prospects
of pleading guilty are good; they also do so in routine or low-visibility cases and in cases where
evidence is very strong); Comment, supra note 154, at 136-37 (open files requirement would not
drastically change status quo). On defense-counsel cooperation with prosecutors, see note 27 supra.
171. See note 133 supra.
172. See notes 52 & 56 supra.
173. One study has predicted that increased sharing of information would produce guilty-plea
convictions in a more timely and efficient manner than is possible without disclosure. Nagel & Neef
(pt. 2), supra note 59, at 21.
174. See note 170 supra.
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Preplea Disclosure
often consumes vast amounts of litigation time,' v the disclosure process
that would result from introduction of a disclosure requirement would be
simple and easily managed. The standard for disclosure would be sim-
ple,"' so compliance with a defendant's motion to compel the prosecutor
to open her file would be easy, and disclosure in the plea process, unlike
discovery in civil litigation, would be limited to one party.'77 In addition,
both the defense attorney and the prosecutor have incentives to prevent
delay. 78 Finally, nothing in the proposed standard for the disclosure obli-
gation would preclude judicial development of mechanisms to prevent un-
due delay."7 9
B. Effects on the Trial Process
Introducing into the guilty-plea process a broad prosecutorial duty to
disclose would significantly extend current requirements for pretrial dis-
closure.6 0 In fact, although some differences in the scope of mandatory
pretrial and preplea disclosure might be preserved, recognizing the defen-
dant's right to broad preplea disclosure might turn out, in most cases, to
be equivalent to giving him a right to equally broad pretrial disclosure. 8'
Nevertheless, that a policy of broad preplea disclosure might effect such
drastic changes in the law of pretrial disclosure is not an insurmountable
objection to adopting the policy.
First, because most convictions result from guilty pleas,"' eliminating
the serious unfairness in the plea process should take precedence over the
aim of preserving pretrial disclosure law. More important, both the crimi-
175. See, e.g., Ebersole, Discovery Problems: Is Help on the Way? 66 A.B.A.J. 50, 50 (1980)
("'[Discovery is at the heart of the problem of delay and the high cost of litigation'. . . .") (quoting
William Lawless); Kaminksy, Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation, 48
FORDHANI L. REV. 907, 908-11 (1980) (counsel often use discovery rules in complex civil litigation to
create delays and increase expenses of opposing party).
176. See p. 1616 supra (duty violated by nondisclosure of any information that might have altered
defendant's agreement to bargain's terms).
177. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30, 31 (party may take oral or written deposition of "any person");
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (subpoena against any person issued on request of party).
178. See notes 28 & 29 supra (prosecutors seek to avoid delay and cost; defendants seek to reduce
time spent on case>.
179. The standard would be consistent with courts having authority to manage disclosure similar
to the authority of the federal courts to manage civil discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (court has
broad discretion to decide if noncompliance with discovery request permissible).
180. See note 156 supra (disclosure duty limited to exculpatory, material evidence).
181. Some defendants who negotiate in good faith, and thereby legitimately obtain the right to
broad disclosure, might fail to reach a plea agreement with the prosecutor and consequently stand
trial with the benefit of much more information than would normally be available. Other defendants,
fully intending to go to trial, might nevertheless use the pretext of plea negotiations to discover evi-
dence possessed by the prosecution. To maintain good relations with the prosecutor's office, however,
many defense attorneys would not intentionally misuse the right to preplea disclosure as a pretrial
discovery device. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 66 (prosecutor knows certain defense attorneys will
not use plea negotiations as trial discovery device).
182. See note 2 supra.
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nal trial's efficiency and its ability to uncover the truth would in all likeli-
hood be promoted by increasing the breadth of mandatory disclosure."' In
criminal cases as in civil cases, sharing information before trial can
sharpen relevant issues, eliminate surprise, expose untenable arguments,
and suggest fruitful evidentiary investigations." 4 Despite these advantages,
however, critics of broad criminal disclosure have noted three risks of in-
creasing the defendant's access to the prosecution's evidence: they point
out that doing so might increase the incidence of fabricated and perjurious
defenses,' 85 might unfairly disadvantage the government, which is deprived
by the Fifth Amendment of reciprocal access to the defendant's case, 8 '
and might lead to the harassment of witnesses.
18 7
The first two criticisms fail to justify rejection of broad preplea disclo-
sure. First, there is no reliable evidence that disclosure would lead to an
increase in fabricated defenses;"' in fact, disclosure would very likely de-
ter perjury by exposing fabricated evidence to a more thorough inquiry.,
Second, any asymmetry in disclosure duties resulting from Fifth Amend-
ment protection would hardly be severe. The prosecutor is entitled to
183. Some commentators have suggested that a right to broad disclosure during criminal proceed-
ings might be granted constitutional status. See Comment, supra note 154, at 135-40 (suggesting that
open-file rule might be adopted by extending Brady); Comment, supra note 11, at 492 (Agurs stan-
dard of materiality too narrow to ensure fair trial). The right might also be implemented by means of
discovery rules or legislation. See Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
the Truth? 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 286-88; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 316-19; Comment, supra note
154, at 140. The latter course seems wiser because it would allow for greater flexibility in defining the
duty and in modifying it as experience with preplea disclosure grew.
184. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 143 (8th Cir. 1968) (purpose of civil
discovery is to narrow issues and to eliminate surprise); Brennan, supra note 183, at 287 (criminal
discovery will sharpen issues, marshal evidence, and expose untenable arguments).
185. See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) (denying discovery rights to
defendant for fear of perjury and suppression of evidence). The New Jersey Supreme Court has since
changed its view. See State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 139, 145 A.2d 313, 316-17 (1958) (fear of
perjury no ground for denying disclosure). See generally Louisell, supra note 10, at 98-101 (discussing
merits of objection to criminal discovery that attorneys for criminal syndicates will use opportunity to
suborn perjury or fabricate defense).
186. See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, J.) (defendants have
strong advantage over government even without discovery).
1-87. In 1975, Congress enacted amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370 (1975), but
only after a provision for the exchange of witnesses' names and addresses three days prior to trial was
removed from the bill in conference. See H.R. REP. No. 94-414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975). The
conference committee report explained: "Discouragement of witnesses and improper contacts directed
at influencing their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns . . . .' Id.
188. See Brennan, supra note 183, at 290; Fletcher, supra note 7, at 310 & n.72; Rice, Criminal
Defense Discovery: A Prelude to Justice or an Interlude for Abuse? 45 MISS. L.J. 887, 897-99
(1974); Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1154
(1951). One commentator has pointed out that whether or not discovery increases perjury, the relevant
inquiry is whether the increase in perjury outweighs the advantages of discovery for the search for
truth. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 305.
189. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 311 (very process of discovery deters perjury: for example;




some discovery from the defendant, 190 and both grand jury inquiries and
police interrogations give the prosecutor considerable access to the defen-
dant's evidence.191 Most important, any difference in disclosure duties
would be offset in part by the difference in information-gathering abili-
ties: the prosecutor's control of the investigation is likely to result in the
gathering of information favorable to the government.
19 2
Unlike the first two criticisms, the third cannot be rebutted. Broad
mandatory disclosure would, as the critics suggest, be undesirable in those
cases where there is a particularly high risk that the defendant will
threaten or harass a prosecution witness (or someone else). Legitimate
concern with the safety of prospective witnesses, however, does not war-
rant depriving all defendants of the fruits of disclosure. Rather, a prosecu-
tor should be permitted to refrain from making disclosures if she believes
that witnesses are in danger. In such a case, however, the defendant
should not be permitted to plead guilty.1 93 In that way, no defendant
would be convicted on the strength of evidence that would not be
presented in court.
194
190. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, 16(b) (providing for disclosure to prosecutor of key ele-
ments of alibi defense and reciprocal discovery of documents, tangible objects, and reports of examina-
tion and tests).
191. See Comment, supra note 154, at 138. To the extent that the opportunity for discovery is not
wholly reciprocal, the extra burden carried by the prosecutor is consistent with the intent of the Fifth
Amendment. Id.
192. See note 10 supra (evidence collected by prosecutor likely to be skewed in favor of
government).
193. Defendants have no absolute right to have their guilty pleas accepted, though the extent of
judicial discretion to reject a plea is unclear. See note 131 supra. Even under the public-interest
standard enunciated in United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622-24 (D.C. Cir. 1973), a guilty
plea might be rejected for lack of disclosure if fairness to the defendant were considered in the public
interest.
The prosecutor need not be required to decide whether to plea bargain with the defendant or to
exercise her right to suppress certain evidence at the initiation of the prosecution. The prosecutor
might engage in negotiations with the defendant without first making full disclosures of material
information. Later on, perhaps after selected disclosures have been made, the prosecutor would have a
better sense of how likely she is to reach a favorable plea agreement with the defendant. The prosecu-
tor thus need not be required to decide whether to make full disclosures or to force a trial until shortly
before the plea hearing, provided that the defendant has a reasonable time to consider the impact of
the final disclosures.
194. A broad disclosure duty might threaten continuing investigations, such as those into white-
collar and organized crime, that are intended to lead to multiple prosecutions. The duty of disclosure
proposed in this Comment, however, would not render such investigations ineffective. It would permit
a prosecutor to reveal to a defendant whose prosecution resulted from a continuing investigation only
the information that is relevant to his chances of acquittal and to exclude other information, especially
information whose disclosure would jeopardize other prosecutions.
Permitting the prosecutor thus to refrain from full disclosure of the complete investigation is not
likely to lead to prosecutorial abuse. Any information not disclosed to one defendant because the
prosecutor believed that its disclosure would jeopardize prosecution of a second defendant would even-
tually be disclosed to the second defendant and thus be on the record. See note 164 supra. The first
defendant could inspect that record for information that had not been disclosed to him but that was
material to his chances of acquittal.
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Conclusion
The present criminal justice system offers defendants many induce-
ments to plead guilty, but affords them only minimal safeguards against
unfair and inaccurate convictions. Moreover, prosecutors and defense at-
torneys can abuse the interests of defendants by taking advantage of the
imbalance in information that pervades the criminal process. Despite these
inadequacies, the current guilty-plea process, which gains what legitimacy
it has from the defendant's consent to waive trial, does not require that the
defendant be given a meaningful opportunity to make his consent fully
informed.
To exercise his consent rationally and to protect himself against unfair
and inaccurate conviction, the defendant must be given an opportunity to
assess his chances of acquittal and thus to evaluate the consideration being
given in return for his plea. The information needed for making such an
assessment is commonly within the exclusive possession of the prosecutor.
A commitment to the notion of consent therefore requires that the prose-
cutor provide the defendant with that information.
Requiring disclosure broad enough to provide defendants with a suffi-
cient opportunity to assess the likelihood of acquittal would in many cases
be equivalent to instituting an obligatory open file system. Such a system,
however, would not be drastically different from present prosecutorial
practices. Broad disclosure would have few if any adverse consequences
for the plea and trial processes.
The American criminal justice system purports to weight the process of
conviction to favor acquittal of innocent defendants. Although it has sacri-
ficed some efficiency in the trial process to achieve this objective, it has
maintained an alternative conviction process that favors the prosecution.
Broad obligatory preplea disclosure would be an important remedy for
some of the inequities in the present criminal justice system and would
thereby help save from obsolescence the values enshrined in the trial
process.
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